

1 Théorie des types

In Martin-Löf's Type Theory, one constructs a closed term :

$$f : \Pi x : N. \Pi y : N. \Sigma z : N. x = y + z \vee y = x + z$$

What can be the normal forms of :

- $\pi_1(f \ 5 \ 3)$
- $(f \ 3 \ 5)$
- $(f \ 5 \ 5)$

2 Logique du 1er ordre

One reminds that normal λ -terms can always be written

$$\lambda x_1 \dots \lambda x_n. (x \ t_1 \ \dots \ t_m)$$

One considers the first-order language built with a single proposition symbol A . Take the following proof of $\Box \vdash A \Rightarrow A$.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\overline{[A \Rightarrow A] \vdash A \Rightarrow A} \quad (\text{Ax})}{\Box \vdash (A \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow (A \Rightarrow A)} \quad (\Rightarrow\text{-I})}{\Box \vdash A \Rightarrow A} \quad (\Rightarrow\text{-E})$$

- a) Give the cut-free version of this proof.
- b) What are these two proofs seen through the Curry-Howard isomorphism ?
- c) Are there other cut-free proofs of $\Box \vdash A \Rightarrow A$? Justify briefly.
- d) We now add the rewrite rule $A \triangleright (A \Rightarrow A)$. We are thus now in deduction modulo. Give a proof of $\Box \vdash A$. What can be said of the corresponding λ -term ?

3 Système T

Define in System T a function $\text{eg} : N \rightarrow N \rightarrow N$ which returns 1 when its arguments are equal and 0 when they are not.

4 Is choosing constructive ?

We place ourselves in Heyting's arithmetic (that is intuitionistic arithmetic)

- a) Explain how one can prove the proposition

$$\forall x. \forall y. x = y \vee \neg(x = y)$$

One may find inspiration in the previous question.

- b) A proposition P is decidable when one can prove $P \vee \neg P$.

Show that if A and B are decidable, then $A \wedge B$, $A \vee B$ et $A \Rightarrow B$ are decidable.

- c) One now adds a choice operator, or "Hilbert operator" to arithmetic. That is for every proposition P (of the language of arithmetic) and every variable x one has :

- an object $\mathcal{E}(x.P)$ in the language,
- a family of axioms $P[x \setminus t] \Rightarrow P[x \setminus \mathcal{E}(x.P)]$ (for every object t).

Show that if $P[x \setminus t]$ is decidable, for any t , then $\exists x.P$ is decidable, in this theory.

d) Show that if $P[x \setminus t]$ is decidable, for any t , then $\forall x.P$ is decidable, in this theory.

e) What can one thus say about all propositions of this theory? or this theory in general. Try to be precise and concise.

5 Déconstruire est-ce choisir ?

We go back to Martin-Löf's type theory. We give ourselves the excluded middle axiom :

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A : \text{Type}}{\Gamma \vdash EM_A : A + (A \rightarrow \perp)}$$

a) In a context where $A : \text{Type}$, $a : A$ et $P : A \rightarrow \text{Type}$, build a term $\mathcal{E}(P) : A$ such that :

$$\Sigma x : A. (P x) \rightarrow (P \mathcal{E}(P)).$$

b) Does the construction of the previous question seem possible in type theory? What is the general conclusion?