Lecture 3

	The CSP approach to the specification and analysis of Security protocols
		Communicating Sequential Processes [Hoare 78]
		Mathematical framework for the description and analysis of systems consisting of processes interacting via exchange of messages
		Automatic tools available for proving properties of CSP specifications
			Model-checker FDR
			Theorem prover PVS

The CSP formalism

	A small mathematical language containing the main constructs for specifying concurrency, parallelism, communication, choice, hiding etc.
	The evolution of processes is based on a sequence of events or actions
		Visible actions S
			Interaction with other processes, communication
		Invisible action t
			Internal computation steps

The CSP language: Syntax

	Inaction: Stop
			Termination, deadlock, incapability of performing any action, either internal or external
	Input: in ? x : A g P(x)
			Execute an input action on channel in, get message x of type A, then continue as P(x)
	Output: out ! m g P(x)
			Execute an output action on channel out, send message m, then continue as P(x)
	Recursion:  P(y1,…,yn) = Body(y1,…,yn)
			Process definition. P is a process name, y1,…,yn are the parameters, Body(y1,…,yn) is a process expression
		Example:   Copy  =  in ? x g out ! m g Copy

CSP’s Syntax (Cont’ed)

	External (aka guarded) choice: P [] Q
			Execute a choice between P and Q. Do not choose a process which cannot proceed
		Example:   (a ? x g P(x)) [] (b ? x g Q(x))
		Execute one and only one input action. If only one is available then choose that one. If both are available than choose arbitrarily. If none are available then block. The unchoosen branch is discarded (commitment)
	Internal choice: P + Q
			Execute an arbitrary choice between P and Q. It is possible to choose a process which cannot proceed

CSP’s Syntax (Cont’ed)

	Parallel operator w/synchronization: P || Q
			P and Q proceed in parallel and are obliged to synchronize on all the common actions
		Example:   (c ? x g P(x)) || (c ! m g Q)
			Synchronization: the two processes can proceed only if their actions correspond
			Handshaking: sending and receiving is symultaneous (clearly an abstraction. Buffered communication can anyway be modeled by implementing a buffer process)
			Communication: m is transmitted to the first process, which continues as P(m).
			Broadcasting: c ! m is available for other parallel procs
	Question: what happens with the process
	((c?xgP(x)) [] (d?y gQ(y)))  ||  (c!m gR)

CSP’s Syntax (Cont’ed)

	Parallel operator w/synchronization and interleaving: P ||A Q
			P and Q are obliged to synchronize only on the common actions in A
			They interleave on all the actions not in A
		Example:
		(c ? x gP(x))  ||{c} ((c ! m gQ) [] (d ! n g R))
			the two processes can either synchronize on the action on channel c, or the second process can perform an action on d. In this second case the first process will remain blocked, though, until the second will decide to perform (if ever) an output action on c.
			Question: in what part of the second process could this action on c be performed ?
		Abbreviation: P ||| Q  stands for P ||f Q

CSP’s Syntax (Cont’ed)

	Hiding: P \ A
			P \A behaves as P except that all the actions in A are turned into invisible actions. So they cannot be used anymore to synchronize with other processes.
			One possible use of this mechanism is to avoid that external processes interfere with the communication channels in P. (Internalization of communication in P.)
	Renaming: P[y/x]
			P[x/y] behaves as P except that all the occurrences of x are renamed by y.
			Typically it serves to create different instances of the same process scheme
			Abbr: P[y1,y2 /x1,x2] will stand for P[y1/x1][y2/x2]

Modeling Security Protocols in CSP

	Security protocols work through the interaction of a number of processes in parallel that send messages to each other. CSP is therefore an obvious notation for describing the participants and their role in the protocol
	Example: The Yahalom protocol
		Message 1    a g b :  a.na
		Message 2    b g s :  b.{a.na.nb}ServerKey(b)
		Message 3    s g a :  {b. kab.na.nb}ServerKey(a) .{a.kab}ServerKey(b)
		Message 4    a g b :  {a. kab}ServerKey(b) .{nb}kab
	Questions:
		Is the it based on symmetric or asymmetric cryptography?
		what are na and nb, and what is their purpose?

Modeling Security Protocols in CSP

	We assume that each process has channels
		Receive
		Send
	that it uses for all communications with the other nodes via the medium
	Let us assume that A (Anne) and B (Bob) use the protocol, with A as initiator  and B as responder, and that J (Jeeves) is the secure server

Modeling Security Protocols in CSP

	A’s view (initiator):
		Message 1  a sends to b:  a.na
		Message 3  a gets from ‘j’:  {b. kab.na.nb}ServerKey(a) .{a.kab}ServerKey(b)
		Message 4  a sends to b:  {a. kab}ServerKey(b) .{nb}kab
	In CSP this behavior can be modeled as follows:
		Initiator(a,na ) =
		env?b: Agent
		g send.a.b.a.na
		g []  (receive.J.a{b. kab.na.nb}ServerKey(a) .m
		kab e Key         g send.a.b.m.{nb}kab g Session(a,b,kab,na,nb) )
		nb e Nonce
		m e T

Modeling Security Protocols in CSP

	B’s view (responder):
		Message 1  b getss from ‘a’:  a.na
		Message 2  b sends to j:  b.{a.na.nb}ServerKey(b)
		Message 4  b gets from ‘a’:  {a. kab}ServerKey(b) .{nb}kab
	In CSP this behavior can be modeled as follows:
		Responder(b,nb ) =
		[]  (receive.a.b.a.na g send.b.J.b .{a.na.nb}ServerKey(b)
		kab e Key          g receive.a.b.{a. kab}ServerKey(b) .{nb}kab
		nb e Nonce  g Session(b,a,kab,na,nb) )
		m e T

Modeling Security Protocols in CSP

	J’s view (server):
		Message 2  j gets from ‘b’:  b.{a.na.nb}ServerKey(b)
		Message 3  j sends to a :  {b. kab.na.nb}ServerKey(a) .{a.kab}ServerKey(b)
	In CSP this behavior can be modeled as follows:
		Server(J,kab ) =
		[]  (receive.b.J.b .{a.na.nb}ServerKey(b)
		A,B e Agent          g send.J.a. {b. kab.na.nb}ServerKey(a) .{a.kab}ServerKey(b)
		Nb ,nb e Nonce  g Server(J,ks ) )
		Server(J)   =  ||| Server(J,kab )
		kab e KeysServer
	Question:   why several server processes in parallel?

Modeling an intruder

	We want to model an intruder that represents all potential intruder behaviors
	Intruder(X) = learn?m: messages gIntruder(close(X U {m})
	[]
	say!m: X /\ messages gIntruder(X)
	Close(X) represents all the possible information that the attacker can infer from X. Typically we assume
		{k,m}  |-  encript(k,m)
		{encript(k,m), k-1}  |-  m
		{Sq<x1,…,xn>} |- xi
		{x1,…,xn}  |-  Sq<x1,…,xn>}

Putting the network together

Alternative with direct channels

	Initiator(Anne,nA)[S]
	|||
	Responder(Bob,nB)[S]
	|||
	Server(Jeeves)[S]
	|||
	Intruder(f)[S]