CSC_51051_EP: Homotopy types

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Part I

Equality

Recall that in Agda, we have to notions of equality:

- definitional equality: we cannot distinguish between $\alpha\beta\eta$ -equivalent terms
- propositional equality: the \equiv predicate that we defined.

We call $t \equiv u$ an identity type and sometimes write it $Id_A(t, u)$.

```
In case you forgot,
```

```
data _=_ {A : Set} (x : A) : (y : A) \rightarrow Set where refl : x \equiv x
```

It is of course possible to directly give the rules satisfied by those types.

Note that definitional equality implies propositional equality: the rule

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash t = u : A}{\Gamma \vdash \text{refl} : \text{Id}_A(t, u)}$

is admissible.

Formation:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \qquad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{Id}_{A}(t, u) : \mathsf{Type}} \; (\mathsf{Id}_{\mathsf{F}})$$

Introduction:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{refl}(t) : \mathsf{Id}_{\mathcal{A}}(t, t)} \; (\mathsf{Id}_{\mathsf{I}})$$

Rules for identity types

Elimination:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \mathsf{Id}_{A}(t, u)}{\frac{\Gamma, x : A, y : A, z : \mathsf{Id}_{A}(x, y) \vdash B : \mathsf{Type} \qquad \Gamma, x : A \vdash r : B[x/x, x/y, \mathsf{refl}(x)/z]}{\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{J}(p, xyz \mapsto B, x \mapsto r) : B[t/x, u/y, p/z]} (\mathsf{Id}_{\mathsf{E}})$$

Computation:

 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{\Gamma} \vdash t : \mathsf{A} \\ \\ \frac{\mathsf{\Gamma}, x : \mathsf{A}, y : \mathsf{A}, z : \mathsf{Id}_{\mathsf{A}}(x, y) \vdash \mathsf{B} : \mathsf{Type} \quad \mathsf{\Gamma}, x : \mathsf{A} \vdash r : \mathsf{B}[x/x, x/y, \mathsf{refl}(x)/z]}{\mathsf{\Gamma} \vdash \mathsf{J}(\mathsf{refl}(t), xyz \mapsto \mathsf{B}, x \mapsto r) = r[t/x] : \mathsf{B}[t/x, t/y, \mathsf{refl}(t)/z]} \ (\mathsf{Id}_{\mathsf{C}}) \end{array}$

UniAggreeniess:

 $J \xrightarrow{\Gamma, x(A A, y \in A)} Z(Bld_A(\langle x, y \rangle) \vdash B_A) \xrightarrow{T} y p = y \xrightarrow{\Gamma, x} S(A, y) (A, z : (kd_A(x_A y) \vdash B : xB_x (Id_U)) \xrightarrow{\Gamma} (Id_U)) \xrightarrow{\Gamma} (Id_U) \xrightarrow{\Gamma} (Id_U) \xrightarrow{\Gamma} (Id_U) \xrightarrow{T} (I$

About the uniqueness rule

The uniqueness rule is problematic:

 $\frac{\mathsf{\Gamma}, x: A, y: A, z: \mathsf{Id}_A(x, y) \vdash B: \mathsf{Type} \qquad \mathsf{\Gamma}, x: A, y: A, z: \mathsf{Id}_A(x, y) \vdash t: B}{\mathsf{\Gamma}, x: A, y: A, z: \mathsf{Id}_A(x, y) \vdash \mathsf{J}(z, xyz \mapsto B, x \mapsto t[x/y, \mathsf{refl}(x)/z]) = t: B} (\mathsf{Id}_{\mathsf{U}})$

Namely, one can show that it implies the admissibility of equality reflection:

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \mathrm{Id}_A(t, u)}{\Gamma \vdash t = u : A}$

which makes typechecking undecidable...

For this reason, it is usually not taken in account.

The definition of equality proposed by Leibniz was that two things should be considered as equal when they cannot be distinguished.

Formally, t and u of type A cannot be distinguished when for every predicate $P : A \rightarrow \text{Type}$, if P t holds then P u holds.

In Agda, we can define the Leibniz equality by

 $_\equiv_1_ : \{A : Set\} (x y : A) \rightarrow Set_1$ $_\equiv_1_ \{A\} x y = (P : A \rightarrow Set) \rightarrow P x \rightarrow P y$

It is not clear at all that this is an equivalence relation, but we will see that it is the case.

Two equal terms are undistinguishible:

leibniz : {A : Set} {x y : A} \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow (P : A \rightarrow Set) \rightarrow P x \rightarrow P y leibniz refl P p = p

and two undistinguishible terms are equal:

Since equality \equiv is an equivalence relation, Leibniz equality also is.

This could also have been shown more directly, e.g.

```
\begin{aligned} \text{leibniz-refl} : & \{A : Set\} \ \{x : A\} \rightarrow ((P : A \rightarrow Set) \rightarrow P \ x \rightarrow P \ x) \\ \text{leibniz-refl} \ & \{x = x\} \ P \ p = p \end{aligned}
```

and

Part II

The axioms K and UIP

Are proofs of identity unique?

An interesting question about identity types is:

are two proofs of $t \equiv u$ necessarily the same?

in particular, is **refl** the only proof of $t \equiv t$?

In order to study this, we can formulate the two following axioms:

```
UIP: uniqueness of identity proofs
UIP : Set1
UIP = {A : Set} {x y : A} (p q : x ≡ y) → p ≡ q

K:
K : Set1
K = {A : Set} {x : A} (P : (x ≡ x) → Set) →
P refl → (p : x ≡ x) → P p
```

UIP vs K

Both axioms are equivalent:

```
UIP-K : UIP \rightarrow K
UIP-K UIP P Pr p = subst P (UIP refl p) Pr
```

and

```
loop-eq : {A : Set} {x y : A} (p q : x ≡ y) →
trans (sym p) q ≡ refl → p ≡ q
loop-eq refl q h = sym h
```

 $x \xrightarrow{p} y$

K-UIP : K \rightarrow UIP K-UIP K p q = loop-eq p q (K (λ r \rightarrow r \equiv refl) refl (trans (sym p) q)) It turns out that by the usual proof technique, we can prove UIP:

```
UIP-proof : {A : Set} {x y : A} (p q : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p \equiv q UIP-proof refl refl = refl
```

and K:

```
K-proof : {A : Set} {x : A} (P : (x ≡ x) → Set) →
P refl → (p : x ≡ x) → P p
K-proof P Pr refl = Pr
```

So, case settled?

Part III

Types as spaces

With or without K?

Surprisingly, K cannot be proved using J only (without pattern matching):

J : {A : Set} (B : (x y : A) → x ≡ y → Set) (r : (x : A) → B x x refl) (t : A) (u : A) (p : t ≡ u) → B t u p J B r t .t refl = r t

If we try to translate the proof

K-proof : {A : Set} {x : A} (P : (x ≡ x) → Set) → P refl → (p : x ≡ x) → P p K-proof P Pr refl = Pr

we begin with something like

but this does not type because **p** is of type $\mathbf{x} \equiv \mathbf{y}$.¹⁵

It turns out that there are models of dependent type theory in which UIP/K is not validated.

In fact, the default pattern matching algorithm of Agda is too liberal!

A saner algorithm can be used by

{-# OPTIONS --without-K #-}

The reason why it is not activated by default is that this makes proofs more complicated... but also more interesting!

With or without K?



It makes your life easier, but if you have too much of it you run into problems.

÷

In order to understand that, we should change our way of thinking:

- **0.** in boolean logic: a type is either 0 or 1,
- 1. in logic with UIP: a type is a set

(e.g. Nat can be seen as the set of natural numbers)

 $\infty.$ in logic without UIP: a type is a space

We will not precisely define what a space is, but you can think of it as

- a topological space, or
- something built up by gluing polyhedra (in arbitrary dimensions)



considered up to "deformation".

Paths

We write / for the segment

I = [0, 1]

with the euclidean topology.

A path from x to y in A is a continuous function

 $f: I \to A$

such that f(0) = x and f(1) = y.

In particular, given a point $x \in A$, there is always the **constant path** from x to x, defined by f(i) = x for $i \in I$.

The idea is that an

- a term t : A corresponds to a point in the space
- an equality $p: Id_A(t, u)$ is path between t and u
- an equality between equalities $\alpha : Id_{Id_A(t,u)}(p,q)$ is homotopy between p and q
- and so on.



Homotopy equivalence

Two functions $f : A \rightarrow B$ and $g : B \rightarrow A$ between spaces are **homotopic** when

- f(x) can be deformed into g(x), i.e. there is a path from f(x) to g(x),
- in a way which is continuous in *x*.

We write this $f \sim g$.

Two spaces A and B are homotopy equivalent when there is

f:A ightarrow B	and	g:B ightarrow A
$g\circ f\sim id_{A}$	and	$f \circ g \sim id_B$

such that

For instance, the following spaces are not homotopy equivalent:



It can be shown that equivalent spaces always have the same number of "holes" in every dimension (and this can even be taken as a definition).

Because it considers spaces up to homotopy equivalence, the resulting theory is called **homotopy type theory**.

This point of view was introduced by Voevodsky (and other people) around 2006.

In order to make this clear, we write Type instead of Set in the following.

Homotopy Type Theory

Univalent Foundations of Mathematics



Elimination on identity types

The elimination principle says that in order to show property depending on a path p, it is enough to show it for the constant path refl.

If we consider spaces up to homotopy we should be careful!

I'm not sure if there should be a case for the constructor refl, because I get stuck when trying to solve the following unification problems (inferred index =? expected index):

x₁ =? x₁

Possible reason why unification failed:

Cannot eliminate reflexive equation $x_1 = x_1$ of type A_1 because K {- $\frac{1}{4}abp for Sdisablfdut-K \#-$ } when checking that the expression ? has type refl $\equiv q$ UIP-proof : {A : Type} (x y : A) (p q : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p \equiv q UIP-proof x .x refl refl = refl

Three important constructions on paths:

- we can build the constant path on a point (refl),
- we can concatenate paths:

 $_\bullet_$: {x y z : A} → (p : x ≡ y) → (q : y ≡ z) → x ≡ z refl • q = q

- we can compute the inverse of a path:
 - ! : {x y : A} \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow y \equiv x ! refl = refl

The structure of paths

Moreover,

• concatenation is associative:

•-assoc : {x y z w : A}
$$\rightarrow$$

(p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow (q : y \equiv z) \rightarrow (r : z \equiv w) \rightarrow
(p • q) • r \equiv p • (q • r)

•-assoc refl refl refl = refl

- admits constant paths as neutral elements,
- and inverses act as such:

•-inv-l : {x y : A}
$$\rightarrow$$
 (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow ! p \bullet p \equiv refl

•-inv-r : {x y : A}
$$\rightarrow$$
 (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p • ! p \equiv refl

•-inv-r refl = refl

This structure is like a group, excepting that we can only compose paths when their target and source endpoints match: this is called a **groupoid**.

Moreover, note that the laws are not exactly satisfied: they are only so up to higher paths...

Part IV

n-types

Now that we have this idea that

TYPE = SPACE

and

equality proof = path

we can begin to think of a classification of types.

The most simple kind of types are propositions which we can think of as being either

- true = a point (or at least equivalent to a point), or
- false = empty.

We can define the type of propositions as

isProp : Type \rightarrow Type isProp A = (x y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y

Propositions

For instance, the empty type is a proposition:

```
\perp-isProp : isProp \perp
\perp-isProp ()
```

The unit type is also a proposition:

```
T-isProp : isProp ⊤
T-isProp tt tt = refl
```

But the booleans are not a proposition:

```
Bool-isnt-prop : ¬ (isProp Bool)
Bool-isnt-prop P with P true false
Bool-isnt-prop P | ()
```

We can even define the type of all propositions as

PROP : Type PROP = Σ Type isProp

(we are really ignoring universes here)

Propositions

A first, it might seem that the circle



is a proposition

isProp : Type \rightarrow Type isProp A = (x y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y

but it is not so, because all the functions we can write are continuous!
Propositions

Propositions act very much like sets with 0 or 1 elements. (up to some approximation because they are not classical!)

For instance, the product (= conjunction) of two such sets is also such:

 $\begin{array}{c|ccc}
0 & 1 \\
\hline
0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1
\end{array}$

Similarly, for any set A, the set $A \to 0$ of functions (= implications) contains either 1 or 0 elements (depending on whether A is empty or not). We thus expect $\neg A$ to be a proposition for any A.

We can show that the conjunction of two propositions is a proposition:

 $\label{eq:sprop-lambda} isProp-lambda : \{A \ B \ : \ Type\} \rightarrow isProp \ A \rightarrow isProp \ B \rightarrow isProp \ (A \times B)$ $isProp-lambda PB \ (a \ , b) \ (a' \ , b') \ with \ PA \ a \ a' \ , \ PB \ b \ b'$ $isProp-lambda PB \ (a \ , b) \ (.a \ , .b) \ | \ refl \ , \ refl \ = \ refl$

However, we cannot prove that $\neg A$ is a proposition

```
isProp-¬ : {A : Type} → isProp (¬ A)
isProp-¬ ¬ x ¬y = ?
```

because we do not have any useful tool to show the equality of functions.

In fact, we need function extensionality:

postulate funext : {A : Type} {B : A \rightarrow Type} \rightarrow {f g : (x : A) \rightarrow B x} \rightarrow ((x : A) \rightarrow f x \equiv g x) \rightarrow f \equiv g

We already mentioned that this axiom was not reasonable, because we want to capture intensional properties of functions.

However, in a homotopic setting, this does not say that f is the same as g, only that one can be deformed to the other.

Moreover, we will see that it actually follows from the main (only?) axiom of homotopy type theory: *univalence*.

We can now show that $\neg A$ is a proposition:

```
The fact of being a proposition is itself a proposition:
```

```
isProp-isProp : {A : Type} → isProp (isProp A)
```

(set later on for the proof).

Note : we started Curry-Howard as

propositions = types

but what we really have is

propositions \subseteq types

The next thing we can define are sets.

We should follow the idea that a set consists of points up to homotopy:



(typically the circle is not a set). We therefore define

```
isSet : Type \rightarrow Type
isSet A = (x y : A) \rightarrow isProp (x \equiv y)
```

For instance, booleans form a set:

```
Bool-isSet : isSet Bool
Bool-isSet false .false refl refl = refl
Bool-isSet true .true refl refl = refl
```

as well as natural numbers:

```
suc-≡ : {m n : ℕ} → (p : suc m ≡ suc n) →

Σ (m ≡ n) (λ q → cong suc q ≡ p)

suc-≡ refl = refl , refl
```

```
N-isSet : isSet N
N-isSet zero .zero refl refl = refl
N-isSet (suc x) .(suc x) refl p with (suc-≡ p)
... | q , e = trans (cong (cong suc) (N-isSet x x refl q)) e
```

More generally,

Theorem (Hedberg) Any type with a decidable equality is a set. Also, propositions are sets:

aProp-isSet : {A : Type} \rightarrow isProp A \rightarrow isSet A

We can notice a "pattern" (of length one...): a set is a type in which there is a at most one equality (up to homotopy) between two elements:

```
isSet : Type \rightarrow Type
isSet A = (x y : A) \rightarrow isProp (x \equiv y)
```

We therefore define a 1-type as

is1Type : Type \rightarrow Type is1Type A = (x y : A) \rightarrow isSet (x \equiv y)



A 1-type is type in which there is at most one equality between two equalities:

• the circle is a 1-type:

• the disk is a 1-type:



• the sphere is not a 1-type:





From now on, the definition of *n*-types is clear:

- a 0-type is a set (by convention),
- an (n+1)-type is a type in which $x \equiv y$ is an *n*-type for every elements x and y.

We have seen that a (-1)-type is a proposition:

```
isProp : Type \rightarrow Type
isProp A = (x y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y
```

An (-2)-type is a contractible type:

isContr : Type \rightarrow Type isContr A = Σ A (λ x \rightarrow (y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y)

A (-3)-type is a contractible type.



Again, it might seem that the circle



is a (-2)-type

isContr : Type \rightarrow Type isContr A = Σ A (λ x \rightarrow (y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y)

but it is not so because functions have to be continuous.

```
In Agda, we can thus define (starting at 0 instead of -2):
```

```
hasLevel : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Type} \rightarrow \text{Type}
hasLevel zero A = \text{isContr } A
hasLevel (suc n) A = (x \ y \ : A) \rightarrow \text{hasLevel n} (x \equiv y)
```



We can show interesting properties such as:

```
Theorem

Any n-type is an (n + 1)-type.

cumulative : (n : \mathbb{N}) {A : Type} \rightarrow hasLevel n A \rightarrow hasLevel (suc n) A

cumulative zero L x y =

(! (snd L x) \bullet snd L y) , \lambda { refl \rightarrow \bullet-inv-l (snd L x) }

cumulative (suc n) L x y = cumulative n (L x y)
```





Or that

Theorem Being an *n*-type is a proposition.

For instance,

```
isProp-isProp : {A : Type} → isProp (isProp A)
isProp-isProp {A = A} f g =
funext2 {f = f} {g = g} (λ x y → aProp-isSet g x y (f x y) (g x y))
```

where funext2 is function extensionality for functions with two arguments.

Part V

Univalence

Let's see some other operations available with paths.

Functions respect identities (intuitively, because they are continuous):

ap : {A B : Type} {x y : A} \rightarrow (f : A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow f x \equiv f y ap f refl = refl

In other words, we can apply a function to a path.

This is what we called **cong** before.

Lemma *Application is compatible with concatenation.*

Proof.

•-ap : {A B : Type} {x y z : A} \rightarrow (f : A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow (q : y \equiv z) \rightarrow ap f (p • q) \equiv ap f p • ap f q •-ap f refl q = refl

Type families

A type family $P : A \rightarrow Type$ should be thought of as a collection of spaces P a for each a : A which varies *continuously* in a:



Given a path p in A from a to a' and a point b in P a we expect that there is a unique path in P whose "projection" on A is p.

We call its other end in P b, the transport of b along p.

Formally, the transport operation is defined as

transport : {A : Type} {x y : A} (P : A \rightarrow Type) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow P x \rightarrow P y transport P refl x = x

This is what we called **subst** before.

Transport

We can show that transporting a path along one of its end amounts to composing it with the path:

transport-≡-r : {A : Type} {x y z : A} → (p : x ≡ y) (q : y ≡ z) → transport (λ y → x ≡ y) q p ≡ (p • q) transport-≡-r p refl = sym (•-unit-r p)

and similarly on the other side:

transport-≡-1 : {A : Type} {x y z : A} → (p : x ≡ y) (q : y ≡ z) → transport (λ y → y ≡ z) (! p) q ≡ (p • q) transport-≡-1 refl q = refl We have defined application of a function $f : A \to B$ to a path $p : x \equiv y$ in A: ap : {A B : Type} {x y : A} \to (f : A \to B) \to x \equiv y \to f x \equiv f y We would like to generalize this operation to a dependent function $f : (a : A) \to B(a)$. We are thus tempted to prove

apd : {A : Type} {B : A \rightarrow Type} {x y : A} \rightarrow (f : (a : A) \rightarrow B a) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow f x \equiv f y

What is the problem?

The correct definition of dependent application is

apd : {A : Type} {B : A \rightarrow Type} {x y : A} \rightarrow (f : (x : A) \rightarrow B x) \rightarrow (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow transport B p (f x) \equiv f y apd f refl = refl

Dependent application

```
Lemma
Every proposition A is a set:
```

```
aProp-isSet : {A : Type} \rightarrow isProp A \rightarrow isSet A
aProp-isSet {A} P x .x refl refl = ?
```

I'm not sure if there should be a case for the constructor refl, because I get stuck when trying to solve the following unification problems (inferred index =? expected index):

x₁ =? x₁

Possible reason why unification failed:

Cannot eliminate reflexive equation $x_1 = x_1$ of type A_1 because K has been disabled.

when checking that the expression ? has type refl \equiv q

Dependent application

Lemma Every proposition A is a set:



Proof.

Given two paths $p, q : x \equiv y$, we have to show $p \equiv q$. Consider p and take a point z. Since A is a proposition, we have a function $f : (x : A) \to z \equiv x$. In particular, we can consider f x and f y. Using apd of f to p we get a path from transport (f x) p to f y but the first is equal to $f x \cdot p$. Therefore, $f x \cdot p \equiv f y$, i.e. $p \equiv (f x)^{-1} \cdot f y$. Similarly, $q \equiv (f x)^{-1} \cdot f y$, and finally $p \equiv q$.

Dependent application

Note that in order to show that $p \equiv (f \times)^{-1} \cdot f y$, we could also have done an induction on p and shown the result in the case where p is refl, i.e.

 $\texttt{refl} \equiv (f x)^{-1} \cdot f x$

which we have already shown.

Formally,

```
aProp-isSet : {A : Type} → isProp A → isSet A
aProp-isSet {A} P x y p q = trans (lem x p) (sym (lem x q))
where
lem : (z : A) (p : x \equiv y) → p \equiv ! (P z x) • (P z y)
lem z refl = sym (•-inv-l (P z x))
```

Two functions are **homotopic** when they are extensionally equal:

~ : {A : Type} {B : A → Type} (f g : (x : A) → B x) → Type _~_ {A} f g = (x : A) → f x ≡ g x

This relation is different from equality between functions (if we do not assume function extensionality or some other axiom).

We can define the identity function on a type A by

```
id : {A : Type} \rightarrow A \rightarrow A
id x = x
```

We can define the composition of functions by

___ : {A : Type} {B : Type} {C : Type} → (B → C) → (A → B) → (A → C) (g ∘ f) x = g (f x)

A function is an equivalence when

The type of equivalences between two types is

 $_\simeq_$: (A B : Type) → Type A \simeq B = Σ (A → B) isEquiv It seems that we could have defined equivalences more simply as

 $\begin{aligned} \text{isEquiv'} : & \{A : Type\} \ \{B : Type\} \ \rightarrow \ (A \ \rightarrow \ B) \ \rightarrow \ Type \\ \text{isEquiv'} \ & \{A\} \ & \{B\} \ f \ = \ \Sigma \ \ (B \ \rightarrow \ A) \ \ (\lambda \ g \ \rightarrow \ (f \ \circ \ g) \ \sim \ \text{id} \ \times \ (g \ \circ \ f) \ \sim \ \text{id}) \end{aligned}$

but this is not equivalent to the previous definition.

In fact this not the right definition, one way to see this is that we have

 $isEquiv-isProp : \{A : Type\} \{B : Type\} (f : A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow isProp (isEquiv f)$

but there exists a function $f : A \rightarrow B$ such that this does not hold for isEquiv'.

It is easy to show that any two equal types are equivalent:

The univalence axiom says that this map is itself an equivalence:

postulate univalence : (A B : Type) → isEquiv (id-to-equiv {A} {B})

Note that we need to be serious about (cumulative) universes here since we have an equivalence between a small and a big type.

The most useful consequence of this is that we have a map

```
ua : {A B : Type} \rightarrow (A \simeq B) \rightarrow (A \equiv B)
ua {A} {B} f with univalence A B
ua {A} {B} f | (g , _) , _ = g f
```

which allows us to make an equality from an equivalence, for which we have the usual tools such as transport.

Unary and binary natural numbers

For instance, we can define binary natural numbers as

```
data Bin : Set where
```

- b0 : Bin
- b1 : List Bool → Bin

(the second being 1 followed by a reversed list of bits).

We can convert binary numbers into unary ones:

```
Bin-to-Nat : Bin \rightarrow \mathbb{N}
Bin-to-Nat b0 = 0
Bin-to-Nat (b1 []) = 1
Bin-to-Nat (b1 (x :: 1)) = (if x then 1 else 0) + 2 * Bin-to-Nat (b1 1)
```

This function can be shown to induce an equivalence between the two representations:

```
Bin-to-Nat-isEquiv : isEquiv (Bin-to-Nat)
```

We can therefore define addition on binary numbers from the one on unary numbers:
In order to understand better univalence, it is simpler to take a variant of

postulate univalence : (A B : Type) → isEquiv (id-to-equiv {A} {B})

Univalence

Any path $p: A \equiv B$ induces a **coercion** function

```
coe : {A B : Type} \rightarrow (A \equiv B) \rightarrow A \rightarrow B
coe p x = transport (\lambda A \rightarrow A) p x
```

which is easily seen to be an equivalence

coe-isEquiv : {A B : Type} (p : A \equiv B) \rightarrow isEquiv (coe p) coe-isEquiv refl = (id , ($\lambda \times \rightarrow$ refl)) , (id , $\lambda \times \rightarrow$ refl)

from which we define

```
id-to-equiv : {A B : Type} \rightarrow (A \equiv B) \rightarrow (A \simeq B)
id-to-equiv p = coe p , coe-isEquiv p
```

and

postulate univalence : (A B : Type) → isEquiv (id-to-equiv {A} {B}) 73

Univalence

The univalence axiom thus says that the function (elimination rule)

 $coe: (A \equiv B) \rightarrow (A \simeq B)$

admits an "inverse" (introduction rule)

 $ext{ua}: (A \simeq B)
ightarrow (A \equiv B)$

i.e.

• computation rule: for every equivalence $f : A \rightarrow B$ and x : A

 $\operatorname{coe}(\operatorname{ua} f) x \equiv f x$

• uniqueness rule: for every $p : A \equiv B$,

 $ua(coe p) \equiv p$

Univalence and classical logic

The univalence axiom is incompatible with classical logic: if we suppose that

 $\neg \neg A \rightarrow A$

holds for every type A then we can prove \bot .

The general idea of the proof is as follows:

- we have an equivalence f : Bool \simeq Bool exchanging true and false,
- by univalence, it induces a non-trivial path p : Bool \equiv Bool,
- the map $\neg \neg A \rightarrow A$ amounts to choosing and element *a* of *A*,
- by transport and happly we can show that we should have $a \cong \text{not } a$,
- we therefore have $true \equiv false$ from which we can deduce \perp .

However, there is no contradiction in supposing

 $\neg \neg A \rightarrow A$

for every proposition A.

For now, we don't have many non-trivial 2-types at our disposal (excepting SET).

Namely, all the types we constructed up to now are <u>sets</u> (natural numbers, lists over sets, etc.).

For instance, there is no easy way to construct something which looks like a circle.

In order to do so, we need a generalization of inductive types: higher inductive types.

In an inductive type, we specify constructors which add elements to the type.

In a higher inductive type, we can also add identities between the elements of the type.

Those are not completely well understood (and implemented) as of now.

Higher inductive types

For instance, we can define the circle



as

data Circle : Type where x : Circle y : Circle p : $x \equiv y$ q : $x \equiv y$ Recall that for booleans

data Bool : Type where
 true : Bool
 false : Bool

the recursion principle is that given

- a type A,
- an element t : A
- an element u : A

there exists a unique function

 $f: \mathsf{Bool} \to A$

```
such that f \text{ true} = t and f \text{ false} = u.
Exercise: define not.
```

If we consider the type

```
data Circle : Type where
```

```
base : Circle
```

```
loop : base \equiv base
```

the corresponding induction principle is that given

- a predicate P : Circle \rightarrow Type,
- an element **b** : **P** base,
- a path I : P base $\equiv P$ base

there exists a (unique up to homotopy) function

 $f:(x:\texttt{Circle}) \to Px$

such that f base = b and f loop = l.

Suspension

```
The suspension of a type A is
data Susp (A : Type) : Type where
N : Susp A
S : Susp B
p : (x : A) \rightarrow N \equiv S
```

In this way, we can construct the *n*-sphere for any dimension n...

Propositional truncation

The propositional truncation of a type is

```
data Trunc (A : Type) : Type where
carrier : A \rightarrow Trunc A
trivial : (x y : Trunc A) \rightarrow x \equiv y
```

Lemma For every type A, Trunc A is a proposition.

It can be thought of as turning a type A into a proposition, i.e. it is (equivalent to) a point when A is non-empty and a empty when A is empty.

However, this is done in an intuitionistic way (the above would rather be $\neg \neg A$).

The recursion principle says that given

- a type **B**,
- a function $g: A \rightarrow B$,
- a path $x \equiv y$ for every x, y : B,

there exists a unique function

 $f: \operatorname{Trunc} A \to B$

such that f = g x for x : A and given x, y : A, ap f sends the specified path from x to y in A to the one between f x and f y in B.

For instance, there is a canonical map from Trunc A to $\neg \neg A$ induced by

- the map $A \rightarrow \neg \neg A$ sending x to $\lambda f.f x$,
- the fact that $\neg \neg A$ is a proposition.

It is an equivalence if and only if the logic is classical.