

Harrop: a new tool in the kitchen of intuitionistic logic

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Background: proof-theoretic kitchen

Background: structural proof theory

What are we talking about?

- Proof theory:
 - Given some *ingredients* (axioms) and *tools* (inference rules)
 - What can we *cook* (prove) in the proof system?

$$\vdash (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A \rightarrow B$$

- **Structural** proof theory: how do recipes look like?

$$\frac{A \rightarrow B \vdash A \rightarrow B}{\vdash (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A \rightarrow B}$$

Background: natural deduction, intuitionistic propositional logic

Natural deduction: a very well known set of tools to cook proofs in intuitionistic propositional logic (**IPC**)

They look like this:

$$\begin{array}{l} \wedge\text{-I: } \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad \Gamma \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \wedge B} \qquad \wedge\text{-E } \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \wedge B}{\Gamma \vdash A} \qquad \vee\text{-I } \frac{\Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma \vdash A \vee B} \\ \vee\text{-E } \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \vee B \quad \Gamma, A \vdash C \quad \Gamma, B \vdash C}{\Gamma \vdash C} \end{array}$$

That is: pairs of introduction and elimination tools for each connective

Background: proof reductions

A central notion in structural proof theory: **proof reduction**
(aka “normalization”, “cut elimination”)

Say we have a recipe ending with

$$\begin{array}{c} \Pi_1 \\ \rightarrow\text{-I} \frac{A \vdash B}{\vdash A \rightarrow B} \quad \Pi_2 \\ \rightarrow\text{-E} \frac{\vdash A \rightarrow B \quad \vdash A}{\vdash B} \end{array}$$

There is a *detour*! Preparing $A \rightarrow B$ first is not necessary

$$\frac{\frac{\Pi_1}{A \vdash B}}{\vdash A \rightarrow B} \quad \Pi_2 \quad \vdash A}{\vdash B} \quad \rightsquigarrow \quad \frac{\Pi_2}{\vdash A} \quad \frac{\Pi_1}{\vdash B}$$

Background: proof reductions

Why do we like Intuitionistic Logic?

- Disjunction property: if $\vdash A \vee B$ is provable, we know which of the two is provable
- Curry-Howard: proofs correspond to idealized functional programs

Why Natural Deduction?

- Transform directly axioms in elimination rules
- Easily get Curry-Howard terms

Intro: Admissibility in propositional intuitionistic logic

Basic definitions

Definition (Admissible and derivable rules)

A rule A / B is admissible if whenever $\vdash A$ is provable, then $\vdash B$ is provable. It is derivable if $\vdash A \rightarrow B$ is provable

Definition (Structural completeness)

A logic is structurally complete if all admissible rules are derivable

So: an admissible rule is a tool we can actually do without

If it is derivable: we can describe *how* to do without, with a recipe inside the logic!

In a structurally complete logic: we always have recipes to explain how to avoid using admissible tools

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Note

Classical logic is structurally complete. Just think of truth tables!

Technical remark

Rules here refer just to formulas, not to Natural Deduction judgements!

Thus: different from *cut/weakening admissibility*

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Theorem (Harrop 1960)

Intuitionistic propositional logic is not structurally complete

Proof.

Counterexample: $\neg B \rightarrow (A_1 \vee A_2) / (\neg B \rightarrow A_1) \vee (\neg B \rightarrow A_2)$ is admissible but not derivable □

We study: admissible but non-derivable “principles” (axioms/rules)

A bit of history

- Friedman (1975): Are the admissible rules of IPC countable?
- Rybakov (1984) answered positively; De Jongh and Visser conjectured a *basis* for them
- lemhoff (2001) proved the conjecture semantically
- Less known: Rozière (1992) independently obtained the same result proof-theoretically

Theorem (Iemhoff 2001, Rozière 1992)

All admissible and non derivable rules are obtained by the usual intuitionistic rules and the following rules

$$V_n : \quad (B_i \rightarrow C_i)_{i=1\dots n} \rightarrow A_1 \vee A_2 / \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \bigvee_{j=1}^n ((B_i \rightarrow C_i)_{i=1\dots n} \rightarrow B_j) \\ \vee \\ ((B_i \rightarrow C_i)_{i=1\dots n} \rightarrow A_1) \\ \vee \\ ((B_i \rightarrow C_i)_{i=1\dots n} \rightarrow A_2) \end{array} \right.$$

Our plan: proof reductions and admissible rules

Problem

Whenever we have a recipe for A , there is one for B . We can't have a recipe for $A \rightarrow B$

How are the two recipes related?

Looks like we miss some *reductions*!

Idea

- Allow admissible inferences in a Natural Deduction system
- Add reduction rules to make these inferences disappear
- ...end up with the desired intuitionistic recipe!

Adding tools to the intuitionistic kitchen

Harrop's rule and the Kreisel-Putnam logic

The most famous admissible principle of **IPC**: Harrop's principle

$$(\neg B \rightarrow (A_1 \vee A_2)) \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow A_1) \vee (\neg B \rightarrow A_2)$$

By adding it to **IPC** we obtain the Kreisel-Putnam logic **KP**

It's a particular case of V_1 , with \perp for C :

$$V_1 : ((B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow (A_1 \vee A_2)) \rightarrow (((B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow A_1) \vee ((B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow A_2))$$

Trivia

KP was the first non-intuitionistic logic to be shown to have the disjunction property

Harrop's rule and the Kreisel-Putnam logic

The most famous admissible principle of **IPC**: Harrop's principle

$$(\neg B \rightarrow (A_1 \vee A_2)) \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow A_1) \vee (\neg B \rightarrow A_2)$$

Transform it to a Natural Deduction rule (based on disjunction elimination)

$$\frac{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash A_1 \vee A_2 \quad \begin{array}{l} \Gamma, \neg B \rightarrow A_1 \vdash D \\ \Gamma, \neg B \rightarrow A_2 \vdash D \end{array}}{D}$$

Ask a proof of the antecedent of Harrop, eliminate the conclusion

Harrop's rule and the Kreisel-Putnam logic

The most famous admissible principle of **IPC**: Harrop's principle

$$(\neg B \rightarrow (A_1 \vee A_2)) \rightarrow (\neg B \rightarrow A_1) \vee (\neg B \rightarrow A_2)$$

The final rule, together with a Curry-Howard term annotation:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : \neg B \vdash t : A_1 \vee A_2 \quad \Gamma, y : \neg B \rightarrow A_1 \vdash u_1 : D \quad \Gamma, y : \neg B \rightarrow A_2 \vdash u_2 : D}{\Gamma \vdash \text{hop}[x.t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2] : D}$$

Harrop's rule and the Kreisel-Putnam logic

Let's turn to the reduction rules!

In the Curry-Howard notation:

- *Harrop-inj*: $\text{hop}[x.\text{inj}_i t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2] \mapsto u_i\{\lambda\vec{x}. t/y\}$
- *Harrop-app*: $\text{hop}[x.\text{efq } [x t] \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2] \mapsto u_i\{(\lambda x.\text{efq } x t)/y\}$

$$\text{Harrop: } \frac{\begin{array}{c} \Pi \\ \vee\text{-I} \frac{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash A_1}{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash A_1 \vee A_2} \quad \Xi_1 \frac{}{\Gamma, \neg B \rightarrow A_1 \vdash D} \quad \Xi_2 \frac{}{\Gamma, \neg B \rightarrow A_2 \vdash D} \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash D}$$

... reduces to

$$\begin{array}{c} \Pi \\ \rightarrow\text{-I} \frac{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash A_i}{\Gamma \vdash \neg B \rightarrow A_i} \\ \Xi_i \\ \hline \Gamma \vdash D \end{array}$$

Harrop's rule and the Kreisel-Putnam logic

Let's turn to the reduction rules!

In the Curry-Howard notation:

- *Harrop-inj*: $\text{hop}[x.\text{inj}_i; t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2]$ $\mapsto u_i\{\lambda\vec{x}. t/y\}$
- *Harrop-app*: $\text{hop}[x.\text{efq}[x t] \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2]$ $\mapsto u_i\{(\lambda x.\text{efq } x t)/y\}$

$$\text{Harrop: } \frac{\text{efq} \frac{\Pi}{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash \perp} \quad \Xi_1 \frac{\Gamma, \neg B \rightarrow A_1 \vdash D}{} \quad \Xi_2 \frac{\Gamma, \neg B \rightarrow A_2 \vdash D}{} \quad \Gamma \vdash D}{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash A_1 \vee A_2}}{\Gamma \vdash D}$$

... reduces to

$$\begin{array}{c} \Pi \\ \text{efq} \frac{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash \perp}{\Gamma, \neg B \vdash A_1} \\ \rightarrow\text{-I} \frac{\Gamma \vdash \neg B \rightarrow A_1}{\Gamma \vdash \neg B \rightarrow A_1} \\ \Xi_1 \\ \Gamma \vdash D \end{array}$$

Definition (Normal form)

A proof is in normal form if no reduction rule is applicable to it

Definition (Strong Normalization)

A proof system has the Strong Normalization property if all proofs reduce to a normal form, regardless of the strategy

Theorem

*Our calculus for **KP** has the Strong Normalization property*

Lemma (Classification)

Let $\Gamma_{\neg} \vdash t : \tau$ for t in n.f. and t not an exfalso:

- If $\tau = A \rightarrow B$, then t is an abstraction or a variable in Γ_{\neg} ;
- If $\tau = A \vee B$, then t is an injection;
- If $\tau = A \wedge B$, then t is a pair;
- If $\tau = \perp$, then $t = x v$ for some v and some $x \in \Gamma_{\neg}$;

Theorem (Disjunction property)

If $\vdash t : A \vee B$, then there is t' such that either $\vdash t' : A$ or $\vdash t' : B$.

What if we try to add the full V_1 principle?

Theorem (Rozière, 1992)

In the logic characterized by the axiom V_1 , all V_i are derivable and all admissible rules are derivable

Rozière called this logic **AD** and showed that it isn't classical logic.
However:

Theorem (Iemhoff, 2001)

*The only logic with the disjunction property where all V_n are admissible is **IPC***

We can as before provide a term assignment for **AD**:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : B \rightarrow C \vdash t : A_1 \vee A_2 \quad \Gamma, y : (B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow A_1 \vdash u_1 : D \quad \Gamma, y : (B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow A_2 \vdash u_2 : D \quad \Gamma, z : (B \rightarrow C) \rightarrow B \vdash v : D}{\Gamma \vdash \forall_1 [x.t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2 \mid z.v] : D}$$

Although it doesn't have the disjunction property, **AD** seems an interesting and not well studied logic.

Rozière posed the problem of finding a functional interpretation for it; we go in this direction by providing a term assignment to proofs

Conclusions

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- Transformed admissible rules into natural deduction rules
- Studied arising logics
- Studied associated Curry-Howard calculus (in the paper)

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But hey! The resulting recipes are in **KP**, **AD**, ... not **IPC**!

Check out (soon):

M M and A C. “Admissible Tools in the Kitchen of Intuitionistic Logic”.
In: *7th International Workshop on Classical Logic & Computation*. 2018

Where we take a different road, sticking to **IPC** and characterizing
all the Visser rule

The *logic based on admissible principles* way:

- More in-depth study of **AD**
- Add new admissible principles

The *admissibility* way:

- Port the system for Visser's rules to other (modal) logics
- Study admissible principles of intuitionistic arithmetic (**HA**)
- ... and admissible principles of first-order logic

Thank you

A Curry-Howard system for admissible rules

Idea: explain Visser's basis with Natural Deduction + Curry-Howard

Advantages:

- Axioms can be translated to rules right away
- Simple way to assign lambda terms
- Focus on reduction rules

The rule should have the shape of a disjunction elimination

Natural deduction rules for V_n

Add to a Natural Deduction system a rule for each of the V_n :

$$\frac{\emptyset, (B_i \rightarrow C_i)_i \vdash A_1 \vee A_2 \quad \Gamma, (B_i \rightarrow C_i)_i \rightarrow A_1 \vdash D \quad \Gamma, (B_i \rightarrow C_i)_i \rightarrow A_2 \vdash D \quad [\Gamma, (B_i \rightarrow C_i)_i \rightarrow B_j \vdash D]_{j=1 \dots n}}{\Gamma \vdash D}$$

Idea: a disjunction elimination, parametrized over n implications

Note The context of the main premise is empty. Otherwise we would be able to prove V_n !

Term assignment

Usual terms for **IPC**, plus the new one for the V-rules

$$\begin{aligned} t, u, v & ::= x \mid uv \mid \lambda x. t \mid \text{efq } t \\ & \mid \langle u, v \rangle \mid \text{proj}_i t \mid \text{inj}_i t \\ & \mid \text{case}[t \mid y.u \mid y.v] \\ & \mid \boxed{V_n[\vec{x}.t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2 \mid z.\vec{v}]} \text{ (Visser)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Gamma, y : (B_i \rightarrow C_i)^i \rightarrow A_1 \vdash u_1 : D$$

$$\Gamma, y : (B_i \rightarrow C_i)^i \rightarrow A_2 \vdash u_2 : D$$

$$\frac{\vec{x} : (B_i \rightarrow C_i)^i \vdash t : A_1 \vee A_2 \quad [\Gamma, z : (B_i \rightarrow C_i)^i \rightarrow B_j \vdash v_j : D]^{j=1 \dots n}}{V_n[\vec{x}.t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2 \mid z.\vec{v}] : D}$$

Reduction rules

Evaluation contexts for **IPC**:

$$W ::= [\cdot] \mid W t \mid t W \mid \text{efq } W \\ \mid \text{proj}_i W \mid \text{case}[W \mid - \mid -]$$

Evaluation contexts for V_n : structural closure of the reduction rules

The usual rules for **IPC**, plus:

- *Visser-inj*: $V_n[\vec{x}. \text{inj}_i t \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2 \mid z.\vec{v}] \mapsto u_i\{\lambda\vec{x}. t/y\}$ ($i = 1, 2$)
- *Visser-app*: $V_n[\vec{x}. W[x_j t] \mid y.u_1 \mid y.u_2 \mid z.\vec{v}] \mapsto v_j\{\lambda\vec{x}. t/z\}$ ($j = 1 \dots n$)

The reduction rules tell us:

- One of the disjuncts is proved directly, or
- A proof for an B_j was provided, to be used on a V-hypothesis

This provides a succinct explanation of what admissible rules can do

The context is empty, so all the hypotheses are Visser-hypotheses, and we can move the terms around

Subject reduction and termination are easy results!

Theorem (De Jongh)

*The propositional formulas whose arithmetical instances are provable in **HA** are the theorems of **IPC***

There is ongoing work to relate admissibility in **IPC** and **HA** through provability logics

We believe our approach can be extended to such cases

For example: the arithmetical *Independence of premises*

$(\neg P \rightarrow \exists x A(x)) \rightarrow \exists x (\neg P \rightarrow A(x))$ can be interpreted with a rule resembling ours

First-order logic

The situation in first-order logic seems much more complicated

However there are some well-behaved examples: Markov's Principle; Constant Domains

These principles give rise to the class of *Herbrand-constructive logics* (Aschieri & M.): whenever $\exists x A(x)$ is provable, there are t_1, \dots, t_n such that $A(t_1) \vee \dots \vee A(t_n)$ is provable