Proof Search Foundations for Logic Programming

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Outline

1. Roles of logic in specifying computation
2. Focus on proof search (logic programming)
3. Proof search in classical and intuitionistic logic
4. Two linear logic programming languages
Roles of Logic in the Specification of Computation

In the specification of computational systems, logics are generally used in one of two approaches.

**Computation-as-model:** Computations are mathematical structures representing computations via nodes, transitions, and state (for example, Turing machines, etc). Logic is used in an external sense to make statements about those structures. E.g. Hoare triples, modal logics.

**Computation-as-deduction:** Logical deduction is used to model computation directly.

*Functional programming.* Programs are proof and computation is modeled using proof normalization ($\lambda$-conversion, cut-elimination).

*Logic programming.* Programs are theories and computation is the search for (cut-free) sequent proofs. For example, code the fact $x$ has value 5 as the atomic formula $(x \ 5)$ or that agent Alice has memory $M$ as $(a \ M)$ (both $x$ and $a$ are predicates). The dynamics of computation are encoded in the changes to sequents that occur during the search for a proof.
Observations

If you add more logical connectives, in FP you don’t get new programs but more types. In LP you get more programs. In particular, linear logic has made a big impact on logic programming design: each new connective is a new combinator for new programs.

Adding logical connectives modularly enriches an LP’s expressiveness. For example, the interplay between higher-orders and modules is not affected by adding linear resources/concurrency. To get the meaning, just read off the proof theory.

Cut-elimination provides for a formal basis for justifying this modularity.
Kowalski’s equation revisited

Algorithm = Logic + Control.

This equation makes the important point that there is a gap between first-order Horn clause specifications and algorithmic specifications. Unfortunately, this equation has been elaborated into:

Programming = Logic + Control + I/O +
+ Higher-order programming
+ Data abstractions
+ Modules
+ Concurrency + . . .

Such extensions are generally ad hoc: logic, which was the motivation and the intriguing starting point, is now put in a minor ghetto. Questions about how various features interact start to dominate the language design. If static analysis is done on purely logical expressions, it can be done deeply and richly. On the mess above, it is severely restricted or impossible.
A goal of declarative programming

A more interesting project would be to get closer to the goal:

Programming = Logic.

If this equation is at all possible, then one will certainly need to rethink what is meant by “Programming” and by “Logic”.

In these lectures, we explore an interpretation of “Logic” that makes use of elements of higher-order logic and linear logic.
Three Logics

Classical Logic: A logic for “truth.” Think of truth tables or models \textit{a la} Tarski. Truth is not dynamic: it is fixed.

\[ \vdash p \lor \neg p \]

Intuitionistic Logic: A logic of proof and construction. Think of type theory or the \( \lambda \)-calculus.

\[ \nvdash p \lor \neg p \]

Linear Logic: A logic of resources. Think of multiset rewriting, vending machines, etc.

- Two quarter can become a cup of coffee and a dime.
- A process can become its continuation and a network message.
Logic programming considered abstractly

Programs and goals are written using logic syntax.

Computation is the process of “proving” that a given goal follows from a given program.

The notion of “proving” should satisfy at least two properties:

1. It should have some deep meta-theoretical properties such as cut-elimination and/or sound and complete model theory. That is, it should be the basis for declarative programming.

2. The interpretation of logical connectives in goals should have a fixed “search” semantics: that is, the interpretation of logical connectives is independent of context. This interpretation of logical connectives is a central feature of logic programming.

Because of this latter property, logic programming is sometimes referred to as called proof search.
Goal Directed Search

To construct a proof of the sequent $\Delta \rightarrow G$, where $G$ is not atomic, use the right introduction rule.

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow G_1 \quad \Delta \rightarrow G_2}{\Delta \rightarrow G_1 \& G_2} & \quad \frac{\Delta, D \rightarrow G}{\Delta \rightarrow D \Rightarrow G}
\end{align*}
$$

A logic makes a abstract logic programming language if such a simple search strategy is complete.

With a multiple-conclusion sequent setting, we would like to generalize this to be simultaneous right introductions.

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta, D \rightarrow G_1, G_3, \Gamma}{\Delta \rightarrow G_1 \& G_3, \Gamma} \quad \frac{\Delta, D \rightarrow G_2, G_3, \Gamma}{\Delta \rightarrow G_1 \& G_2, D \Rightarrow G_3, \Gamma}
\end{align*}
$$

If enough introduction rules permute, you can “simulate” simultaneous introduction.
Zoo of linear logic connectives

− ◦  linear implication (lollipop)

!  reuse modal (bang)

?  dual modal (why not)

⇒  intuitionistic implication, $A \Rightarrow B \equiv ! A \circ B$

&  additive conjunctions (with)

⊗  multiplicative conjunctions (tensor)

⊕  additive disjunctions

↛  multiplicative disjunctions (par)

⊤  additive truth: $\top \& A \equiv A$

1  multiplicative truth: $1 \otimes A \equiv A$

0  additive false: $0 \oplus A \equiv A$

⊥  multiplicative false: $\bot \otimes A \equiv A$

(−)⊥  negation

∀, ∃  quantifiers
A Series of Logic Programming Languages

Horn clauses (Prolog) Unrestricted use of \{\& , \top\} but \forall , \Rightarrow are restricted to the top-level only. For example, \forall \overline{x}(A_1 \& \cdots \& A_n \Rightarrow A_0).

Hereditary Harrop formulas (\lambda Prolog) Unrestricted use of \{\forall , \Rightarrow , \& , \top\}. For example, \forall x((Bx \& \forall y(Cxy \Rightarrow Dy)) \Rightarrow Dx).

Lolli (a linear refinement of \lambda Prolog) Unrestricted use of \{\forall , \neg , \Rightarrow , \& , \top\}. For example, \forall x((Bx \neg \forall y(Cxy \Rightarrow Dy)) \Rightarrow Dx).

Linear Objects (LO) Unrestricted use of \{\& , \top, \& , \perp\} with only top-level occurrences of \forall , \neg.
\forall \overline{x}(G \neg A_1 \& \cdots \& A_n)(n \geq 1)

Forum Unrestricted use of \{\forall , \neg , \Rightarrow , \& , \top, \& , \perp\}. For example,
\forall x(Bx \neg \forall y(Cxy \Rightarrow Dy) \Rightarrow Dx \& Bx)
Forum is a presentation of all of linear logic

The linear logic connectives missing from Forum are definable.

\[ B^\perp \equiv B \multimap \perp \quad 0 \equiv \top \multimap \perp \quad 1 \equiv \perp \multimap \perp \]
\[ !B \equiv (B \Rightarrow \perp) \multimap \perp \quad B \oplus C \equiv (B^\perp \& C^\perp)^\perp \quad B \otimes C \equiv (B^\perp \nexists C^\perp)^\perp \]
\[ \exists x. B \equiv (\forall x. B^\perp)^\perp \]

The collection of connectives in Forum are not minimal. For example, \(?\) and \(\nexists\), can be defined in terms of the remaining connectives.

\[ ?B \equiv (B \multimap \perp) \Rightarrow \perp \quad \text{and} \quad B \nexists C \equiv (B \multimap \perp) \multimap C \]
A proof system for intuitionistic logic

A sequent $\Gamma 
\rightarrow
C$ contains a set of formulas $\Gamma$ and a single formula $C$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Gamma, B \rightarrow B}{\Gamma, B_1 \rightarrow C} & \quad \text{initial} \\
\frac{\Gamma, B_1 & B_2 \rightarrow C}{\&L} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, B_2 \rightarrow C}{\&L} & \quad \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow B}{\Gamma \rightarrow B & C} & \quad \&R \\
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow B \Gamma, C \rightarrow E}{\Rightarrow L} & \quad \frac{\Gamma, B \rightarrow C}{\Gamma \rightarrow B \Rightarrow C} & \quad \Rightarrow R \\
\frac{\Gamma, B[t/x] \rightarrow C}{\forall L} & \quad \frac{\Gamma \rightarrow B[y/x]}{\forall R},
\end{align*}
\]

provided that $y$ is not free in the lower sequent.

\[
\frac{\Gamma' \rightarrow B \Gamma, B \rightarrow C}{\Gamma' \rightarrow C} \quad \text{cut,}
\]

provided $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$.

Given that left-hand contexts are sets, if the pattern matches $\Gamma, B$, it might be the case that $B \in \Gamma$. 
Backchaining as left-introduction rules

\[
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \rightarrow C}{\Gamma \rightarrow B \& C} \quad \text{&R} \quad \frac{\Gamma, A \rightarrow A}{\Gamma, B \& C \Rightarrow A \rightarrow A} \quad \text{initial} \\
\Rightarrow L
\]

\[
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow C \quad \Gamma, A \rightarrow A}{\Gamma, C \Rightarrow A \rightarrow A} \quad \text{initial} \\
\Rightarrow L
\]

\[
\frac{\Gamma \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma, C \Rightarrow A \rightarrow A}{\Gamma, B \Rightarrow C \Rightarrow A \rightarrow A} \Rightarrow L
\]

Of course, \( B \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow A) \equiv (B \& C) \Rightarrow A \) is the familiar curry/uncurry equivalence. The formula \((B \& C) \Rightarrow A\) is written in Prolog as

\[ A :- B, C. \]
Expressive strength: changes in context

Consider a cut-free proof of the sequent $\Gamma \rightarrow A$. Let $\Gamma' \rightarrow A'$ be a sequent somewhere in this proof. (Assume that $A$ and $A'$ are atomic formulas.)

In all cases, $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma'$. Contexts can only grow as one moves up through a proof.

If $\Gamma$ is a set of Horn clauses, then, in fact, $\Gamma' = \Gamma$. Proof search with Horn clauses is flat and does not allow abstractions (eg, modules).

The atoms $A$ and $A'$ can be related arbitrarily. Thus, the dynamics of a computation must be captured within atoms; that is, within non-logical contexts. Thus, the dynamics is out of the reach of logical principles (modus ponens, cut-elimination, etc).

Linear logic will allow much greater ability to code dynamics within logical contexts.
Proof system for a fragment of linear logic

\begin{align*}
\frac{B \rightarrow B}{\Delta, B \rightarrow B} & \quad \text{initial} \\
\frac{\Delta, B \rightarrow C}{\Delta, B_1 \& B_2 \rightarrow C} & \quad \& L (i = 1, 2) \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta \rightarrow \top} & \quad \top R \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta, B \rightarrow C} & \quad \& R \\
\frac{\Delta, B_1 \rightarrow C}{\Delta_1, B_1 \& B_2 \rightarrow C} & \quad \& L \\
\frac{\Delta, B_2 \rightarrow C}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2, B \rightarrow C \rightarrow E} & \quad \& (i = 1, 2) \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta, B \rightarrow E} & \quad \& (i = 1, 2) \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta, B \rightarrow C \rightarrow E} & \quad \& R \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta, B \rightarrow C \rightarrow E} & \quad \& R \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta, \forall x. B \rightarrow C} & \quad \forall L \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B[y/x]}{\Delta \rightarrow \forall x. B} & \quad \forall R, \\
\text{provided that } y \text{ is not free in the lower sequent}.
\end{align*}

\frac{\Delta \rightarrow B}{\Delta, \Delta' \rightarrow C} \quad \text{cut}
Goal-directed search in linear logic

The notion of “goal-directed proofs” can be formalized using the following technical notion: A cut-free proof is *uniform* if every sequent with a non-atomic right-hand side is the conclusion of a right-introduction rule.

In intuitionistic logic, the following are provable but not with uniform proofs:

\[ p \lor q \Rightarrow q \lor p \quad \exists x.p x \Rightarrow \exists x.p x \]
\[ q \& (q \Rightarrow (r \lor s)) \Rightarrow (r \lor s) \]

In linear logic, the following are provable but not with uniform proofs:

\[ p \otimes q \Rightarrow q \otimes p \quad !p \Rightarrow !p \]
\[ q \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow (r \otimes s)) \Rightarrow (r \otimes s) \]

For these reasons, \( \lor, \exists, \otimes, \) and \(!\) are not generally allowed unrestricted in logic programming languages.
Proof system for Lolli

\[ \Gamma; A \rightarrow A \text{ initial} \]

\[ \Gamma, B; \Delta, B \rightarrow C \text{ absorb} \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow \top \text{ \top R} \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, B_i \rightarrow C \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, B_1 \& B_2 \rightarrow C \text{ \& L} \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow B \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow B \& C \text{ \& R} \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, B \rightarrow \circ C \rightarrow E \text{ \circ L} \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, B \rightarrow \circ C \rightarrow E \text{ \circ R} \]

\[ \Gamma; \emptyset \rightarrow B \Gamma; \Delta, C \rightarrow E \Rightarrow L \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, B \Rightarrow C \rightarrow E \Rightarrow R \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, B[t/x] \rightarrow C \forall L \]

\[ \Gamma; \Delta, \forall x.B \rightarrow C \text{ \forall R} \]

provided that \( y \) is not free in the lower sequent.

\[ \Gamma'; \Delta_1 \rightarrow B \Gamma; \Delta_2, B \rightarrow C \text{ cut} \]

\[ \Gamma'; \Delta_1, \Delta_2 \rightarrow C \text{ cut}! \]

\[ \Gamma', \emptyset \rightarrow B \Gamma, B; \Delta \rightarrow C \text{ cut!} \]

Two forms of the cut rule for \( L \). Both rules have the proviso that \( \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma' \).
How to Toggle a Switch

Occurrences of \( \otimes \)-R can be allows (as with \( \exists \)-R, \( \lor \)-R, etc).

\[
\frac{\Gamma; \Delta_1 \to B \quad \Gamma; \Delta_2 \to C}{\Gamma; \Delta_1, \Delta_2 \to B \otimes C} \otimes R
\]

Consider the Lolli (Forum) program:

\( \text{toggle } G \leftarrow \exists u \exists v[sw \ v \otimes \text{flip } v \ u \otimes (sw \ u \leftarrow G)]. \)

\( \text{flip on off.} \)

\( \text{flip off on.} \)

Assume that these three clauses are members of \( \Psi \).

\[
\begin{align*}
\Psi; \text{sw on} \to \text{sw on} & \quad \Psi; \text{flip on off} \to \text{flip on off} & \quad \Psi; \Delta, \text{sw off} \to G \\
\frac{\Psi; \Delta, \text{sw on} \to \text{sw on} \otimes \text{flip on off} \otimes (sw \ off \leftarrow G)}{
\Psi; \Delta, \text{sw on} \to \exists v \exists u[sw \ v \otimes \text{flip } v \ u \otimes (sw \ u \leftarrow G)]}
\end{align*}
\]

\( \Psi; \Delta, \text{sw on} \to \text{toggle } G \)
Reversing a list in Prolog

Move one item from top of one list to the top of the other list.

(1::2::3::nil)  nil.
(2::3::nil)     (1::nil).
(3::nil)        (2::1::nil).
nil             (3::2::1::nil).

This can be encoded as the program

rv nil (3::2::1::nil).
rv (X::L) M :- rv L (X::M).

and the query

rv (1::2::3::nil) nil.

Not really a good program since it is written for one list only.

Notice that reverse is symmetric. Proof: Flip both rows and columns!
A better specification

Put the previously written code into “local block” definitions within another definition. Then abstract out (1::2::3::nil) and (3::2::1::nil) for variables.

\[
∀L, K[
(∀rv ((∀M, N, X(rv N (X :: M) \circ rv (X :: N) M)) ⇒ rv nil K \circ rv L nil))
\circ reverse L K]
\]

The base case is assumed linearly! An attempt to prove

\textit{reverse} (1 :: 2 :: 3 :: nil) (3 :: 2 :: 1 :: nil)

results in the introduction of a new predicate \textit{rv} and the attempt to prove that from the two clauses

\textit{rv} nil (3 :: 2 :: 1 :: nil)

\textit{rv} (1 :: 2 :: 3 :: nil) nil.
Theorem. Reverse is symmetric; that is, if \( \vdash \text{reverse} \ L \ K \) then \( \vdash \text{reverse} \ K \ L \).

Proof. Assume that \( \vdash \text{reverse} \ L \ K \). Thus, the body of reverse’s clause must be provable.

\[
\vdash \forall r ( ( \forall M, N, X (r N (X :: M) \Rightarrow r (X :: N) M)) \Rightarrow r \text{nil} K \Rightarrow r L \text{nil})
\]

Now, instantiate this quantifier with the term \( \lambda x \lambda y. (r v x) \perp \), and we have that

\[
\vdash (\forall M, N, X ((r v M (X :: N)) \perp \Rightarrow (r v K \text{nil}) \perp \Rightarrow (r v \text{nil} L) \perp))
\]

Using the linear logic equivalence of the contrapositive rule: \( p \perp \Rightarrow q \perp \equiv q \Rightarrow p \), we have

\[
\vdash (\forall M, N, X (r v M (X :: N) \Rightarrow r (X :: M) N)) \Rightarrow r \text{nil} L \Rightarrow r K \text{nil}
\]

By universal generalization over \( r v \), we have

\[
\vdash \forall r ( (\forall M, N, X (r v M (X :: N) \Rightarrow r (X :: M) N)) \Rightarrow r \text{nil} L \Rightarrow r K \text{nil})
\]

This matches the body of the reverse problem if we switch \( L \) and \( K \). Thus, we can conclude that \( \vdash \text{reverse} \ K \ L \).
An application of linear logic:
Representing and reasoning about sequent systems

Joint work with Elaine Pimentel
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Outline

1. Metalogical settings for specifying proof systems.
2. Some generalizations of multiset rewriting in linear logic
3. Representing sequents and inference rules
4. Entailment between encodings of proof systems
5. Establishing object-level cut elimination
Intuitionistic-based frameworks and natural deduction

Higher-order logics and dependently typed λ-calculi based on intuitionistic logic have been proposed for encoding natural deduction systems.

- higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas: Isabelle, λProlog, etc.
- LF: Twelf, etc.

\[(A) \\
\vdots \\
B \quad C \\
\hline \\
D \\
\quad (prove A \Rightarrow prove B) \land prove C \Rightarrow prove D.\]
Advantages of using meta-logics and frameworks

Bound variables — in formulas and in proofs (eigenvariable) — are treated uniformly and declaratively by the meta-level (higher-order abstract syntax is generally supported).

Meta-level \( \beta \)-normalization can directly provide object-level substitution.

When reasoning about specifications, “substitution lemmas” often come for free.

Proof search in intuitionistic logic is well studied and has several robust implementations.
Which framework for specifying sequent calculus?

Clearly, sequents can be encoded into existing frameworks by representing them as pairs of lists of formulas, etc.

But sequent calculus has numerous *dualities*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>left</th>
<th>right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initial</td>
<td>cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synchronous</td>
<td>asynchronous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A framework should account for such dualities directly (problematic in intuitionistic logic).

Structural rules play a significant role in defining logical connectives in sequent calculi.

Sequent calculus seems to be more general than natural deduction.

Linear logic makes a good candidate: it has an involutive negation, allows contraction and weakening to be controlled, and refines intuitionistic logic.
Flat Forum

For the purpose of specifying sequent calculus, we need only a subset of Forum. A formula of Forum is a flat goal if it does not contain occurrences of \( \neg \circ \) and \( \supset \), and all occurrences of the modal \( ? \) have atomic scope. A formula of the form

\[
\forall \bar{y}(G_1 \leftarrow \cdots \leftarrow G_m \leftarrow A_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes A_n), \quad (m, n \geq 0)
\]

is called a flat clause if \( G_1, \ldots, G_m \) are flat goals, \( A_1, \ldots, A_n \) are atomic formulas, and occurrences of the symbol \( \leftarrow \) are either occurrences of \( \neg \circ \) or \( \supset \).

The formula \( A_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes A_n \) is the head of such a clause, while for each \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), the formula \( G_i \) is a body of this clause. If \( n = 0 \), then we write the head as simply \( \bot \) and say that the head is empty.

Negation \( B \bot \) is equivalent to \( B \neg \circ \bot \).

We sometimes use uncurried clauses via the logical equivalences:

\[
(B \otimes C) \neg \circ H \equiv B \neg \circ C \neg \circ H \quad (\exists x. B \ x) \neg \circ H \equiv \forall x. (B(x) \neg \circ H) \uparrow
\]

\[
(B \oplus C) \neg \circ H \equiv (B \neg \circ H) \& (C \neg \circ H) \quad (! B) \neg \circ H \equiv B \supset H \quad 1 \neg \circ H \equiv H.
\]

\( \uparrow \) Provided \( x \) is not free in \( H \).
Flat Forum sequents

Sequents in full Forum (linear logic) are of the form $\Psi; \Delta \rightarrow \Gamma; \Upsilon$ where $\Psi$ and $\Upsilon$ are sets of formulas that can be used unbounded number of times and $\Delta$ and $\Gamma$ are multisets of formulas that are bounded in their use.

The logic program is generally identified with $\Psi$.

When using flat Forum, the zone $\Psi$ does not change in proof search and $\Delta$ will be empty. Thus, we do not write the left-hand side of Forum sequents.

The sequent

$$\rightarrow B_1, \ldots, B_n; C_1, \ldots, C_m$$

is related to the linear logic formula

$$B_1 \not\vdash \ldots \not\vdash B_n \not\vdash C_1 \not\vdash \ldots \not\vdash C_m.$$
Backchaining and multiset rewriting

Multiset rewriting can be captured naturally in proof search. Assume, for example, that the clause

\[ a \not\in \mathcal{R} b \leftarrow c \not\in \mathcal{R} d \not\in \mathcal{R} e. \]

is a member of the logic program specification (in \( \Psi \)). Consider the following proof fragment.

\[
\begin{align*}
&\frac{\rightarrow c, d, e, \Gamma; \Upsilon}{\rightarrow c, d \not\in \mathcal{R} e, \Gamma; \Upsilon} \\
&\frac{\rightarrow c \not\in \mathcal{R} d \not\in \mathcal{R} e, \Gamma; \Upsilon}{\rightarrow c \not\in \mathcal{R} d \not\in \mathcal{R} e \leftarrow a \not\in \mathcal{R} b \rightarrow a, b, \Gamma; \Upsilon} \\
&\frac{\rightarrow a, b, \Gamma; \Upsilon}{\rightarrow a, b, \Gamma; \Upsilon}
\end{align*}
\]

We can interpret this proof fragment as a reduction of the multiset \( a, b, \Gamma \) to the multiset \( c, d, e, \Gamma \) by backchaining on the clause displayed above.

Members of \( \Upsilon \) are considered permanent members of the multiset, as well.
Splitting and copying of contexts

Backchaining on the clause $G_1 \cdot G_2 \supset G_3 \cdot B_1 \not\supseteq B_2$ (which is logically equivalent to $(G_1 \otimes !G_2 \otimes G_3) \cdot B_1 \not\supseteq B_2$) to prove the sequent

$$\rightarrow B_1, B_2, A; \Upsilon$$

yields an attempt to prove the three sequents

$$\rightarrow G_1, A_1; \Upsilon \quad \rightarrow G_2; \Upsilon \quad \rightarrow G_3, A_2; \Upsilon$$

where $A$ is split into $A_1$ and $A_2$.

Backchaining on the clause $G_1 \& G_2 \cdot B$ to prove the sequent

$$\rightarrow B, A; \Upsilon$$

yields an attempt to prove the two sequents

$$\rightarrow G_1, A; \Upsilon \quad \rightarrow G_2, A; \Upsilon.$$

Here, context is copied.
Encoding sequents

Let \([ \cdot ]\) and \([\cdot ]\) be two meta-level predicates, both of type \( bool \rightarrow o \), used to identify which object-level formulas appear on the left and right of the sequent arrow. The ? modal is used to mark the formulas to which weakening and contraction can be applied.

Consider encoding the object-level sequent \(B_1, \ldots, B_n \rightarrow C_1, \ldots, C_m\) \((n, m \geq 0)\) as a meta-level formula or a meta-level sequent. Examples of encodings might be the following.

**Linear scheme:** \( [B_1] \g {-} \ldots \g {-} [B_n] \g {-} [C_1] \g {-} \ldots \g {-} [C_m] \) or
\[
\rightarrow [B_1], \ldots, [B_n], [C_1], \ldots, [C_m];
\]

**Classical scheme:** \( ?[B_1] \g {-} \ldots \g {-} ?[B_n] \g {-} ?[C_1] \g {-} \ldots \g {-} ?[C_m] \) or
\[
\rightarrow \cdot; [B_1], \ldots, [B_n], [C_1], \ldots, [C_m].
\]

**Intuitionistic scheme:** \( ?[B_1] \g {-} \ldots \g {-} ?[B_n] \g {-} ?[C_1] \g {-} \ldots \g {-} ?[C_m] \) or
\[
\rightarrow [C_1], \ldots, [C_m]; [B_1], \ldots, [B_n].
\]
Encoding additive and multiplicative inference rules

Consider the **additive introduction rules** for conjunction.

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta, A \rightarrow \Gamma}{\Delta, A \land B \rightarrow \Gamma} & \quad \land L_1 \\
\frac{\Delta, B \rightarrow \Gamma}{\Delta, A \land B \rightarrow \Gamma} & \quad \land L_2 \\
\frac{\Delta \rightarrow \Gamma, A}{\Delta \rightarrow \Gamma, A \land B} & \quad \land R
\end{align*}
\]

These three inference rules can be specified in Forum using the clauses

\[
(\land L_1) \quad [A \land B] \dashv [A]. \quad (\land R) \quad [A \land B] \dashv [A] \& [B].
\]

\[
(\land L_2) \quad [A \land B] \dashv [B].
\]

Consider the **multiplicative inference rules** for this connective.

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta, A, B \rightarrow \Gamma}{\Delta, A \land B \rightarrow \Gamma} & \quad \land L \\
\frac{\Delta_1 \rightarrow \Gamma_1, A}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \rightarrow \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, A \land B} & \quad \land R \\
\frac{\Delta_2 \rightarrow \Gamma_2, B}{\Delta \rightarrow \Gamma, A \land B}
\end{align*}
\]

These two rules can be encoded using the following Forum clauses.

\[
(\land L) \quad [A \land B] \dashv [A] \otimes [B]. \quad (\land R) \quad [A \land B] \dashv [A] \otimes [B].
\]

Notice that the clause for right introduction could be written equivalently in linear logic as

\[
[A \land B] \dashv [A] \otimes [B].
\]
Encoding quantifier introduction rules

Using quantification at higher-order types, it is a simple matter to encode the inference rules for object-level quantifiers.

\[(\forall L) \ [\forall B] \circ− [B x].\] \[(\forall R) \ [\forall B] \circ− \forall x[B x].\]

Here, the symbol \(\forall\) is used for both meta-level and object-level quantification: at the object-level \(\forall\) has the type \((i \to \text{bool}) \to \text{bool}\). Thus the variable \(B\) above has the type \(i \to \text{bool}\).

Meta-level treatment of substitution and eigenvariables directly implements the appropriate restrictions at the object-level.

Notice that the clause for \((\forall L)\) in uncurried form is

\[ [\forall B] \circ− \exists x[B x].\]

Thus, these quantifier rules make use of two (dual) meta-level quantifiers.
The cut and initial rules

Until now, all clauses are introduction rules have heads that are (meta-level) atomic formulas. Encodings of cut and initial rules are different.

The initial rule

\[ \frac{B}{B} \]

is encoded using the clause

\[ (Initial) \quad [B] \nRightarrow [B]. \]

This clause has two atoms in its head and none in its body. The cut rule

\[ \frac{\Delta_1 \rightarrow \Gamma_1, B \quad \Delta_2, B \rightarrow \Gamma_2}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \rightarrow \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2} \]

can be specified simply as the clause

\[ (Cut) \quad \bot \dashv [B] \vdash [B]. \]

This clause has an empty head and two atoms in its body. Other cut-rules are possible:

\[ \bot \dashv ?[B] \vdash [B] \quad \bot \dashv [B] \vdash ?[B] \quad \bot \dashv ?[B] \vdash ?[B] \]
Cut and initial provide dual information

The initial formula $[B] \gtrless [B]$ is logically equivalent to $[B] \perp \circ [B]$.  
The cut formula $\perp \circ [B] \circ [B]$ is logically equivalent to $[B] \circ [B] \perp$.  

Taken together, we have (the not surprising fact) that left and right are duals of each other:  

$$[B] \equiv [B] \perp.$$  

Of course, if the cut and initial rules involve some modals (as in intuitionistic or classical encodings of sequents), then this equivalence will also involve modals.
Advantages of such encodings

• The Forum specifications do not deal with context explicitly (side formulas): they only mention the formulas that are directly involved in the inference rule.

• The distinction between additive and multiplicative inference rules is achieved using the appropriate linear logic connective.

• Object-level quantifiers and substitution is handled directly by the meta-logic.

• The structural rules of contraction and thinning can be captured together using the ? modal.

• Since the encodings yield abstract logic programming, procedures for proof search and unification in linear logic can be used to help fashion implementations of object-logics.

• Since the encoding of proof systems is natural and direct, we hope to be able to use the rich meta-theory of linear logic to help draw conclusions about object-level proof systems.
Disadvantages of such encodings

• Since the meta-level is commutative, **non-commutative proof systems** cannot be encoded directly. One might turn this into a test: can a proposed non-commutative logic be used at the meta-level to capture non-commutative object-logics?

• Logics that require hypersequents for their characterized seem unlikely candidates for this framework.

• This kind of work generally only captures “conventional” proof systems, not the avant guard ones.
Specification of the $LK$ sequent calculus

$(\supset L) \ [A \supset B] \vdash ?[A] \vdash ?[B]$.  
$(\supset R) \ [A \supset B] \vdash ?[A] \兑?[B]$.

$(\land L_1) \ [A \land B] \vdash ?[A]$.  
$(\land R) \ [A \land B] \vdash ?[A] \land ?[B]$.

$(\land L_2) \ [A \land B] \vdash ?[B]$.  
$(\lor R_1) \ [A \lor B] \vdash ?[A]$.

$(\lor L) \ [A \lor B] \vdash ?[A] \land ?[B]$.  
$(\lor R_2) \ [A \lor B] \vdash ?[B]$.

$(\forall L) \ \forall B \vdash ?[Bx]$.  
$(\forall R) \ \forall B \vdash \forall x ?[Bx]$.

$(\exists L) \ \exists B \vdash \forall x ?[Bx]$.  
$(\exists R) \ \exists B \vdash ?[Bx]$.

$(f L) \ [f] \vdash \top$.  
$(t R) \ [t] \vdash \top$.

$(Cut) \ \bot \vdash ?[B] \vdash ?[B]$.

$(Initial) \ [B] \兑[B]$.
Specification of the *LJ* sequent calculus

\((\Rightarrow L)\) \([A \Rightarrow B] \vdash \lceil A \rceil \vdash \lceil \lnot B \rceil\). \(\Rightarrow R\) \([A \Rightarrow B] \vdash \lceil \lnot A \rceil \uplus \lceil B \rceil\).

\((\wedge L_1)\) \([A \wedge B] \vdash \lceil A \rceil\). \(\wedge R\) \([A \wedge B] \vdash \lceil A \rceil \& \lceil B \rceil\).

\((\wedge L_2)\) \([A \wedge B] \vdash \lceil \lnot B \rceil\). \(\vee R_1\) \([A \vee B] \vdash \lceil A \rceil\).

\((\vee L)\) \([A \vee B] \vdash \lceil A \rceil \& \lceil \lnot B \rceil\). \(\vee R_2\) \([A \vee B] \vdash \lceil \lnot B \rceil\).

\((\forall L)\) \([\forall B] \vdash \lceil \lnot Bx \rceil\). \(\forall R\) \([\forall B] \vdash \forall x [\lnot Bx]\).

\((\exists L)\) \([\exists B] \vdash \forall x [Bx]\). \(\exists R\) \([\exists B] \vdash [Bx]\).

\((fL)\) \([f] \vdash \top\). \(tR\) \([t] \vdash \top\).

\((Cut)\) \(\bot \vdash \lceil \lnot B \rceil \vdash [B]\). \(Initial\) \([B] \uplus [B]\).
Introducing polarities

\[(Pos) \quad [B] \circ \rightarrow ?[B].\]

\[(Neg) \quad [B] \circ \leftarrow ?[B].\]

The converses of the Pos and Neg implications are, of course, linear logic theorems.

If one studies the LU (Logic of Unity) logic of Girard, these two clauses are applied not to all formula but only to certain formulas. Controlling polarity makes it possible for classical, intuitionistic, and linear logic to co-exist in one logic. The paper in the proceedings contains a new proof of cut-elimination of LU.
Modular presentations of classical and intuitionistic logics

The essential difference between the theories $LJ$ and $LK$ is the different set of occurrences of the ? modal. Let $LK_0$ and $LJ_0$ be the result of removing the cut and initial rules as well as deleting the ? modal from the $LK$ and $LJ$.

Define the two new theories

$$LJ' = LJ_0 \cup \{\text{Cut, Initial, Pos}_2\} \text{ and}$$

$$LK' = LK_0 \cup \{\text{Cut, Initial, Pos}_2, \text{Neg}_2\}.$$  

While $LJ'$ is a strengthening of $LJ$, they can both prove the same object-level, intuitionistic sequents. Similarly for $LK'$ and $LK$. 
Collapsing of modal prefixes

The Cut and Initial rules of $LK$ prove the equivalences

$$
\forall B. ?[B] \equiv (?[B])^\perp \quad \forall B. ?[B] \equiv ![B] \quad \forall B. ?[B] \equiv ![B].
$$

The Cut and Initial rules of $LJ$ prove the equivalences

$$
\forall B.[B] \equiv (?[B])^\perp \quad \forall B.[B] \equiv ![B].
$$

In the cases of $LJ$ and $LK$, that duality forces the collapse of some of modals.

As is well known, linear logic has 7 distinct modalities:

- empty, !, ?, ?!, !?, !?!, ?!?.

In the $LK$ theory, however, all those modals collapse into just two when applied to a $[\cdot]$-atom or a $[\cdot]$-atom. In the presence of $LJ$, they collapse to four when applied to $[\cdot]$-atoms.

Such collapsing limits the distinction available for controlling the use of formulas during proof search.
The calculus LKQ and LKT calculi

(⊢ L)  [A ⊃ B]  ⊢ [A] ⇒ ?[B].  (⊢ R)  [A ⊃ B]  ⇒ ?[A] ≻?[B].
(∀L)  [∀B]  ⇒ ?[Bx].  (∀R)  [∀B]  ⇒ ∀x?[Bx].
(Cut)  ⊥  ⊢ [A]  ⊢ ?[A].  (Initial)  [A] ≻?[A].
      ⊥  ⊢ ?[A]  ⇒ ?[A].

(⊢ L)  [A ⊃ B]  ⇒ ?[A]  ⊢ [B].  (⊢ R)  [A ⊃ B]  ⊢ ?[A] ≻?[B].
(∀L)  [∀B]  ⊢ [Bx].  (∀R)  [∀B]  ⊢ ∀x?[Bx].
(Cut)  ⊥  ⊢ ?[A]  ⊢ [A].  (Initial)  [A] ≻?[A].
      ⊥  ⇒ ?[A]  ⊢ ?[A].

A non-standard inference system: \textit{IIL}^*

\begin{align*}
(\text{Initial}) & & [A] \not\vdash [A] \rightarrow \top \rightarrow \text{atomic}(A). \\
(\Rightarrow R) & & [B \Rightarrow C] \rightarrow [B] \not\vdash [C]. \\
(\Rightarrow 1L) & & [A \Rightarrow B] \not\vdash [A] \& ([B] \not\vdash [D]) \rightarrow \text{atomic}(A). \\
(\Rightarrow 2L) & & [(A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow C] \not\vdash ([B \Rightarrow C] \not\vdash [A \Rightarrow B]) \& ([C] \not\vdash [D]).
\end{align*}

Due to Dyckhoff; Lincoln, Scedrov, and Shankar [APAL93]; and several others.
Deriving NJ from LJ

From LJ we have:

\[ \forall B. [B] \perp \equiv ?[B] \quad \forall B. [B] \equiv ![B] \quad \forall B. [B] \equiv ?[B] \]

Thus, all occurrences of \([B]\) and ?\([B]\) can be replaced by \([B]\perp\). The introduction rules for implication

\[ (\Rightarrow L) \quad [A \Rightarrow B] \dashv [A] \dashv ?[B]. \]
\[ (\Rightarrow R) \quad [A \Rightarrow B] \dashv [A] \not\dashv ?[A] \not\dashv [B]. \]

are thus transformed to

\[ [A \Rightarrow B] \perp \dashv [A] \dashv [B] \perp. \]
\[ [A \Rightarrow B] \dashv [A] \not\dashv [A] \not\dashv [B]. \]

which are equivalent to

\[ (\Rightarrow E) \quad [B] \dashv [A] \dashv [A \Rightarrow B]\]
\[ (\Rightarrow I) \quad [A \Rightarrow B] \dashv [A] \Rightarrow [B]. \]

These are the usual \(\Rightarrow\) elimination rule of natural deduction.
Disjunction and existential in LJ

The story for the disjunction and existential is (predictably) more complicated.

\[(\forall R) \quad [A \lor B] \to [A] \oplus [B].\]
\[(\forall L) \quad [A \lor B] \to ?[A] \land ?[B].\]
\[(\exists R) \quad [\exists B] \to [Bx].\]
\[(\exists L) \quad [\exists B] \to \forall x.?[Bx]).\]

\[(\forall I)' \quad [A \lor B] \to [A] \oplus [B].\]
\[(\forall E)' \quad \bot \to [A \lor B] \to ([A] \Rightarrow \bot) \land ([B] \Rightarrow \bot).\]
\[(\exists I)' \quad [\exists B] \to [Bx].\]
\[(\exists E)' \quad \bot \to [\exists B] \to \forall x.[Bx] \Rightarrow \bot.\]

\[(\forall I) \quad [A \lor B] \to [A] \oplus [B].\]
\[(\forall E) \quad [E] \to [A \lor B] \to ([A] \Rightarrow [E]) \to ([B] \Rightarrow [E]).\]
\[(\exists I) \quad [\exists B] \to [Bx].\]
\[(\exists E) \quad [E] \to [\exists B] \to \forall x.[Bx] \Rightarrow [E].\]
Some results about encoded proofs systems

**Definition:** An *introduction clause* is a closed flat formula of the form

\[ \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n[q(\diamond(x_1, \ldots, x_n)) \leftarrow B_1 \leftarrow B_2 \leftarrow \ldots \leftarrow B_m], \]

where \( n, m \geq 0 \), \( \diamond \) is an object-level connective of arity \( n \) (\( n \geq 0 \)), and atoms occurring in a body of this clause are either of the form \( p(x_i) \) or \( p(x_i(y)) \). Here, \( p \) and \( q \) are either \( \lfloor \cdot \rfloor \) or \( \lceil \cdot \rceil \).

**Definition:** A *canonical proof system* is a set \( P \) of flat Forum clauses such that

(i) the initial clause is a member of \( P \),
(ii) exactly one cut clause is a member of \( P \), and
(iii) all other clauses in \( P \) are introduction clauses with the additional restriction that, for every pair of atoms of the form \( \lfloor T \rfloor \) and \( \lceil S \rceil \) in a body, the head variable of \( T \) differs from head variable of \( S \). A formula that satisfies condition (iii) is also called a *canonical clause*. 
Coherent proof systems

Definition: Write all the left and right introduction rules for the connective $\Diamond$ in the uncurried form as

$$\forall x([\Diamond(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] \vdash B_l) \quad \text{and} \quad \forall x([\Diamond(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] \vdash B_r)$$

Let $C$ be the cut clause that appears in $P$. The object-level connective $\Diamond$ has dual left and right introduction rules if $!C \vdash \forall x(B_l \rightarrow B_r \rightarrow \bot)$ in linear logic.

A canonical system is called coherent if the left and right introduction rules for every object-level connective are duals.
To show, for example, that $LJ$ is coherent, the following must be proved.

$$(\Rightarrow) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash \forall A \forall B [ (?[A] \oplus ?[B]) \rightarrow ([A] \& [B]) \rightarrow \bot]$$

$$(\land) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash \forall A \forall B [ (?[A] \otimes ?[B]) \rightarrow (?[A] \not\exists [B]) \rightarrow \bot]$$

$$(\lor) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash \forall A \forall B [ (?[A] \& ?[B]) \rightarrow ([A] \oplus [B]) \rightarrow \bot]$$

$$(\forall) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash \forall B \exists x (?[B x]) \rightarrow \forall x [B x] \rightarrow \bot]$$

$$(\exists) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash \forall B \forall x (?[B x]) \rightarrow \exists x [B x] \rightarrow \bot]$$

$$(t) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash 0 \rightarrow \top \rightarrow \bot]$$

$$(f) \quad \text{Cut}_2 \vdash \top \rightarrow 0 \rightarrow \bot]$$

All are provable in Forum easily. Here, $\text{Cut}_2$ is $\forall B ([B] \rightarrow ?[B] \rightarrow \bot)$. 
Derivability of one proof system from another

Theorem: If $\mathcal{P}$ is a coherent proof system and $\{C_1, \ldots, C_n\}$ is a set of canonical clauses (possibly including the initial clause) then $\mathcal{P} \vdash !C_1 \& \ldots \& !C_n$ if and only if forall $i = 1, \ldots, n$, there is a Forum proof of height 3 or less of $\mathcal{P} \vdash C_i$.

NB: derivability is generally much simpler to establish than admissibility. The later generally requires induction.

We show now an admissibility result: cut is admissible in a system without cut.
Object-level cut-elimination holds for coherent systems

Theorem: Let $\mathcal{P}$ be a coherent system and $B$ be an object-level formula. If $\mathcal{P} \vdash [B]$ is provable, then there is an object-level cut-free proof of the Forum sequent $\mathcal{P}; \cdot \rightarrow [B]; \cdot$.

Theorem: Determining whether or not a canonical proof system is coherent is decidable. In particular, determining duality of a right and left introduction rule connective can be done by bounding proof search to a depth of $v + 2$ where $v$ is the maximum number of meta-level atomic subformulas in the bodies of the introduction clauses. (Usually $v = 2$.)

Related work:

- Frank Pfenning, *Structural Cut Elimination*, LICS95.
A brief list of references


• Dale Miller and Elaine Pimentel, *Using linear logic to reason about sequent systems*. Proceedings of Tableaux 2002, LNCS.