#### Communicating and trusting formal proofs

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For more, see papers in: CADE2013, CPP 2011/13/15.

#### What can we trust?







# In cryptology: Trust the math



#### Bruce Schneier

With software systems, there are so many things to trust.

- verification condition generators
- type checkers, type inference, abstract interpretation
- compilers
- printers and parsers
- theorem provers

All this seems overwhelming. Our challenge here:

#### provide the framework so that we can at least trust proofs.

We restriction our of attention to *formal proofs*, generated and checked by computer tools.

# The current situation with formal proofs

Most proof production and checking is technology based.



If you change the version number of a prover, it may not recognized its earlier proofs.

Most proofs are locked into the technology.

Some bridges are now being built between different provers, but these are affected by two version numbers.

#### In them we can trust



de Bruijn, Huet, Paulson, Boyer, Moore







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Obvious, this model of trust does not scale!

## The vision: The network is the prover

#### Sun Microsystems (1984): The network is the computer



The formal methods community uses many isolated provers technologies: proof assistants (Coq, Isabelle, HOL, PVS, etc), model checkers, SAT solvers, etc.

**Goal:** Permit the formal methods community to become a network of communicating provers.

Proof certificates: documents that circulate and denote proofs.

**Approach:** Provide formal definitions of "proof evidence" so that proof certificates can be checked by *trusted checkers*.

# Many computer systems producing many kinds of proofs

There is a wide range of provers.

- automated and interactive theorem provers
- computer algebra systems
- model checkers, SAT solvers
- type inference, static analysis
- testers

There is a wide range of "proof evidence."

- proof scripts for steering a theorem prover to a proof
- resolution refutations, natural deduction, tableaux, etc
- winning strategies, simulations

If the necessary networking infrastructure is built, a wider range of provers and proof evidence would appear.

We focus here on how we might separate proof from provenance.

- Provers *output* proof evidence for a theorem (via some "proof language").
- *Trusted* checkers must be available to check such evidence.

If we do our job right, proofs become a commodity and our attention turns other aspects of computer systems.

Three central questions:

- How can we manage so many "proof languages"?
- Will we need just as many proof checkers?
- How does this improve trust?

Computer scientists have seen this kind of problem before.

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Computer scientists have seen this kind of problem before.

We develop *frameworks* to address such questions.

- lexical analysis: finite state machines / transducers
- language syntax: grammars, parsers, attribute grammars, parser generators
- programming languages: denotational and operational semantics

Church's Simple Theory of Types (STT) is a good choice for the syntax of formulas.

Understood well in both classical and intuitionistic settings.

Propositional, first-order, and higher-order logics are easily identifiable sublogics of STT.

Many other logics can adequately be encoded into STT: eg, equational, modal, temporal, etc.

STT is a popular choice in various implemented systems.

There is likely to always be a frontier of research that involves logics that do not fit well into a fixed framework. C'est la vie.

Frege, Hilbert, Church, Gödel, etc, made extensive use of the following notion of proof:

A proof is a list of formulas, each one of which is either an axiom or the conclusion of an inference rule whose premises come earlier in the list.

While granting us trust, there is little useful structure here.

# The first programmable proof checker



LCF/ML (1979) viewed proofs as slight generalizations of such lists.

ML provided types, abstract datatypes, and higher-order programming in order to increase confidence in proof checking.

Many provers today (HOL, Coq, Isabelle) follow LCF principles.

#### **Atoms of inference**

- Gentzen's **sequent calculus** first provided these: introduction, identity, and structural rules.
- Girard's linear logic refined our understanding of these further.
- To account for first-order structure, we also need **fixed points** and **equality**.

#### **Rules of Chemistry**

• Focused proof systems show us that some atoms stick together while other atoms form boundaries.

#### **Molecules of inference**

• Collections of atomic inference rules that stick together form synthetic inference rules.

## Features enabled for proof certificates

- Simple checkers can be implemented. Only the atoms of inference and the rules of chemistry (both small and closed sets) need to be implemented in a checker of certificates.
- Certificates support a wide range of proof systems. The molecules of inference can be engineered into a wide range of inference rules.
- Certificates are based (ultimately) on proof theory. Immediate by design.
- Proof details can be elided.

Search using atoms will match search in the space of molecules: that is, the checker will not invent new molecules.

# An analogy between two frameworks: SOS and FPC

Structural Operational Semantics (SOS)

- There are many programming languages.
- **②** SOS can define the semantics of many of them.
- Solution Logic programming can provide prototype interpreters.
- Ompliant compilers can be built based on the semantics.

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Foundational Proof Certificates (FPC)

- There are many forms of proof evidence.
- PPC can define the semantics of many of them.
- Solution Logic programming can provide prototype checkers.
- **(** Compliant checkers can be built based on the semantics.

## Clerks and experts: the office workflow analogy

Imagine an accounting office that needs to check if a certain mound of financial documents (provided by a **client**) represents a legal tax transaction (as judged by the **kernel**).

Experts look into the mound and extract information and

- decide which transactions to dig into and
- *release* their findings for storage and later reconsideration.

**Clerks** take information released by the experts and perform some computations on them, including their *indexing* and *storing*.

Focused proofs alternate between two phases: *positive* (experts are active) and *negative* (clerks are active).

The terms *decide*, *store*, and *release* come from proof theory.

A proof certificate format defines workflow and the duties of the clerks and experts.

Clearly, (determinate) computation is built into this paradigm: the clerks can perform such computation.

Proof *reconstruction* might be needed when invoking not-so-expert experts (or ambiguous tax forms).

Non-deterministic computation is part of the mix: non-determinism is an important resource that is useful for proof-compression.

# The LKneg proof system

Use invertible rules where possible. In propositional classical logic, both conjunction and disjunction can be given invertible rules.

$$\frac{\vdash \cdot; B}{\vdash B} \text{ start} \qquad \frac{\vdash \Delta, L; \Gamma}{\vdash \Delta; L, \Gamma} \text{ store} \qquad \frac{\vdash \Delta, A, \neg A; \cdot}{\vdash \Delta, A, \neg A; \cdot} \text{ init}$$
$$\frac{\vdash \Delta; \Gamma}{\vdash \Delta; \text{ false}, \Gamma} \qquad \frac{\vdash \Delta; B, C, \Gamma}{\vdash \Delta; B \lor C, \Gamma} \qquad \frac{\vdash \Delta; true, \Gamma}{\vdash \Delta; true, \Gamma} \qquad \frac{\vdash \Delta; B, \Gamma \vdash \Delta; C, \Gamma}{\vdash \Delta; B \land C, \Gamma}$$

Here, A is an atom, L a literal,  $\Delta$  a multiset of literals, and  $\Gamma$  a list of formulas. Sequents have two *zones*.

This proof system provides a decision procedure (resembling conjunctive normal forms).

A small (constant sized) certificate is possible.

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Consider proving  $(p \lor C) \lor \neg p$  for large *C*.

# The LKpos proof system

Non-invertible rules are used here.

$$\begin{array}{c} \vdash B; \cdot; B \\ \hline \vdash B \end{array} \text{ start } \qquad \begin{array}{c} \vdash B; \mathcal{N}, \neg A; B \\ \hline \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; \neg A \end{array} \text{ restart } \qquad \begin{array}{c} \vdash B; \mathcal{N}, \neg A; A \end{array} \text{ init } \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; B_{i} \\ \hline \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; B_{1} \lor B_{2} \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; \text{ true } \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; B_{1} & \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; B_{2} \\ \hline \vdash B; \mathcal{N}; B_{1} \land B_{2} \end{array}$$

Here, A is an atom and  $\mathcal{N}$  is a multiset of negated atoms. Sequents have three *zones*.

The  $\lor$  rule can consume some external information or some non-determinism.

An *oracle string*, a series of bits used to indicate whether to go left or right, can be a proof certificate.

Let C have several alternations of conjunction and disjunction. Let  $B = (p \lor C) \lor \neg p$ .



The subformula C is avoided. Clever choices \* are injected at these points: right, left, left. We have a small certificate and small checking time. In general, these certificates may grow large.

Combining the LKneg and LKpos proof systems

Introduce two versions of conjunction, disjunction, and their units.

$$t^-, t^+, f^-, f^+, \sqrt{-}, \sqrt{+}, \wedge^-, \wedge^+$$

The inference rules for negative connectives are invertible.

These polarized connectives also exist in linear logic.

Introduce the two kinds of sequent, namely,  $\vdash \Theta \Uparrow \Gamma$ : for invertible (negative) rules ( $\Gamma$  a list of formulas)  $\vdash \Theta \Downarrow B$ : for non-invertible (positive) rules (B a formula)

#### LKF : a focused proof systems for classical logic

P is a positive formula; N is a negative formula; A is an atom; C positive formula or negative literal

# Results about LKF

Let *B* be a propositional logic formula and let  $\hat{B}$  result from *B* by placing + or - on *t*, *f*,  $\wedge$ , and  $\vee$  (there are exponentially many such placements).

Theorem. [Liang & M, TCS 2009]

- If B is a tautology then every polarization B has an LKF proof.
- If some polarization  $\hat{B}$  has an LKF proof, then B is a tautology.

The different polarizations do not change *provability* but can radically change the *proofs*.

Also:

- Negative (non-atomic) formulas are treated linearly (never weakened nor contracted).
- Only positive formulas are contracted (in the Decide rule).

#### Example: deciding on a simple clause

Assume that  $\Theta$  contains the formula  $a \wedge^+ b \wedge^+ \neg c$  and that we have a derivation that Decides on this formula.

$$\frac{\vdash \Theta \Downarrow a \text{ Init } \vdash \Theta \Downarrow b \text{ Init } \stackrel{\vdash \Theta, \neg c \Uparrow \cdot}{\vdash \Theta \Uparrow \neg c}}{\vdash \Theta \Downarrow a \wedge^+ b \wedge^+ \neg c} \underbrace{\text{Store}}_{\vdash \Theta \Downarrow \neg c} \wedge^+_{\wedge +}$$

This derivation is possible iff  $\Theta$  is of the form  $\neg a, \neg b, \Theta'$ . Thus, the "macro-rule" is

$$\frac{\vdash \neg a, \neg b, \neg c, \Theta' \uparrow \cdot}{\vdash \neg a, \neg b, \Theta' \uparrow \cdot}$$

#### Example: Resolution as a proof certificate

- A clause:  $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n [L_1 \lor \dots \lor L_m]$
- C<sub>3</sub> is a *resolution* of C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub> if we chose the mgu of two complementary literals, one from each of C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub>, etc.
- If  $C_3$  is a resolvent of  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  then  $\vdash \neg C_1, \neg C_2 \uparrow C_3$  has a short proof (decide depth 2 or less).

Translate a refutation of  $C_1, \ldots, C_n$  into a (focused) sequent proof with small holes:

$$\frac{\Xi}{\vdash \neg C_1, \neg C_2 \Uparrow C_{n+1}} \xrightarrow{\vdash \neg C_1, \dots, \neg C_n, \neg C_{n+1} \Uparrow}_{\vdash \neg C_1, \dots, \neg C_n \Uparrow \neg C_{n+1}} Store Cut$$

Here,  $\Xi$  can be replaced with a "hole" bounded by depth 2.

# Reference proof checking in $\lambda$ Prolog



Logic programming can check proofs in sequent calculus.

Proof reconstruction requires unification and (bounded) proof search.

The  $\lambda$ Prolog programming language [M & Nadathur, 1986, 2012] also include types, abstract datatypes, and higher-order programming.

We first "instrument" the inference rules with terms denoting proof certificates and add premises that invoke "clerks" and "experts".

$$\begin{array}{c|c} \Xi_1 \vdash \Theta \Uparrow \Gamma, A & \Xi_2 \vdash \Theta \Uparrow \Gamma, B & \wedge \mathsf{clerk}(\Xi_0, \Xi_1, \Xi_2) \\ \hline & \Xi_0 \vdash \Theta \Uparrow \Gamma, A \wedge^- B \\ \hline & \Xi_1 \vdash \Theta \Downarrow B_i & \vee \mathsf{expert}(\Xi_0, \Xi_1, i) \end{array}$$

$$\Xi_0 \vdash \Theta \Downarrow B_1 \lor^+ B_2$$

Turning inference rules sideways yields logic programs. Soundness of checking is reduced to soundness of the logic programming implementation.

The formal definition of "proof evidence" involves

- describing the structure of the certificate terms  $\Xi$  and
- providing the definition of the clerk and expert predicates.

# An FPC: Checking by conjunctive normal form

type	lit	index.
type	cnf	cert.

andNeg_kc	cnf	cnf	cnf.	
orNeg_kc		$\operatorname{cnf}$	cnf.	
false_kc		$\operatorname{cnf}$	cnf.	
release_ke		$\operatorname{cnf}$	cnf.	
initial_ke			$\operatorname{cnf}$	lit.
decide_ke		$\operatorname{cnf}$	$\operatorname{cnf}$	lit.
store_kc		$\operatorname{cnf}$	$\operatorname{cnf}$	lit.

The token cnf is just passed around during the checking. The only items that are stored are literals and they are all indexed the same, using lit.

#### An FPC: Checking binary resolution

```
type idx
                          int -> index.
type lit
                                 index.
kind resol
                                  type.
type resol
           int -> int -> int -> resol.
type dl
                     list int
                               -> cert.
type ddone
                                  cert.
type rdone
                                  cert.
type rlist
                    list resol -> cert.
type rlisti int -> list resol -> cert.
orNeg_kc (dl L) _ (dl L).
false_kc (dl L) (dl L).
store kc (dl L) C lit (dl L).
decide ke (dl [I]) (idx I) (dl []).
decide_ke (dl [I,J]) (idx I) (dl [J]).
decide_ke (dl [J,I]) (idx I) (dl [J])
all kc (dl L) (x \ dl L).
true_ke (dl L).
some_ke (dl L) _ (dl L).
andPos ke (dl L) (dl L) (dl L).
release_ke (dl L) (dl L).
initial_ke (dl L) _.
decide ke (dl L) ddone.
initial_ke ddone _.
false kc (rlist R) (rlist R).
store kc (rlisti K R) (idx K) (rlist R).
true_ke
        rdone.
decide_ke (rlist []) (idx I) rdone.
cut ke (rlist [(resol I J K) |R]) CutForm (dl [I,J]) (rlisti K R).
```

#### The ProofCert project: recent results

- The FPC framework for first-order (classical and intuitionistic) logics.
- Defined an array of proof certificate formats:
  - Classical: resolution, expansion trees, matings, CNF, etc.
  - Intuitionistic: natural deduction, various typed  $\lambda$ -calculus.
  - Also: Frege systems, equality reasoning, etc.
- Implemented a reference kernel (using  $\lambda$ Prolog / Teyjus)
- The intuitionistic checker can "host" the classical kernel.

Address inductive and co-inductive reasoning.

- Certificates for model checking.
- Checking inductive proofs needs invariants but these are seldom given explicitly.
- Various techniques guarantee existence of invariants: Predicate abstractions, bisimulation-up-to, etc.

Develop certificates for various modal and temporal logics.

Treat parallelism in proof structures (using multi-focusing and multi-cut rules).

### The ProofCert project: still further ahead

Performant checkers

Standards and adoption

Design of libraries of theorems and proofs

Develop an approach to theories: set theories, type theories, etc.

Integrating counter-examples / counter-models

Once proofs are checked, how can we read / browse them?

# Thank you. Questions?

LF: The logical framework of Harper, Honsell, and Plotkin [1987, 1993] (a.k.a.  $\lambda \Pi$ ).

It seems straightforward to encode LF, LFSC (LF with side conditions), and LF modulo (Dedukti) as FPCs.

Alone LF does not seem to have the right "atoms of inference."

- Canonical normal forms provide only one structuring of proofs.
- These lack an analytic notion of classical reasoning and sharing.
- Also lacking is a natural treatment of parallel proof steps.