

MPRI 2-7-2: Proof Assistants

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Goals

- ▶ Learn the basics of using Coq
 - ▶ Specification language (Gallina)
 - ▶ Modelization
 - ▶ Tactics
- ▶ Study the underlying theory (Type Theory)
 - ▶ Formalisms: Martin L of's TT, Calculus of Constructions.
 - ▶ Features: inductive types.
 - ▶ Meta-theory: extraction, strong normalization, paradoxes.

Organization

Lectures:

- ▶ 8 lectures of 3h (1h30 theory + 1h30 TPs)
- ▶ Teachers: Bruno Barras (4), Matthieu Sozeau (4)

Evaluation:

- ▶ A written exam (3h), (date: 3/2/17).
- ▶ 2 exercises, written report

Program

- ▶ 12/8 (BB): λ -calculus, Curry-Howard isomorphism, dependent types.
- ▶ 12/15 (BB): Polymorphism, Calculus of Constructions, Pure Type Systems.
- ▶ 1/5 (BB): CIC and general inductive types.
- ▶ 1/12 (BB): Theory of inductive types: inductive families, positivity. *1st exercise handout*.
- ▶ 1/19 (MS): Advanced inductive types : singletons, sort restrictions, extraction and dependently-typed programming.
- ▶ 1/26 (MS): Modelization of mathematical structures. *1st ex. due, 2nd exercise handout*
- ▶ 2/2 (MS): Proof by reflexion : boolean, computational.
- ▶ 2/9 (MS): Homotopy Type Theory. *2nd ex. due*
- ▶ 2/16, 2/23: no lectures.

Installing Coq

See <http://coq.inria.fr>.

- ▶ Linux: packages of major distributions, or opam
- ▶ Mac: precompiled binaries (dmg) or opam
- ▶ Windows: precompiled binaries (installer)

Learning Coq

This module is just an initiation. See

`http://coq.inria.fr/documentation` for other methods:

- ▶ Coq'Art (Y. Bertot, P. Casteran)
- ▶ Software Foundations (B. Pierce)
- ▶ Certified Programming with Dependent Types (A. Chlipala)
- ▶ ...

Help:

- ▶ Video tutorials (A. Bauer)
- ▶ Wiki: cocorico, list: coq-club, irc, ...

Plan

Proof Assistants

Untyped λ -calculus

Simply typed λ -calculus

Curry-Howard isomorphism

Dependent types

Proofs on computers

For doing proofs with computers we need:

- ▶ A language to represent **objects** : integers, functions, sets, ...
- ▶ A language to represent **properties** of objects : first-order logic, higher-order logic.
- ▶ A method to construct/verify **proofs** (basic rules + a way to mechanize them).

Approach based on higher-order logic:

- ▶ **typed lambda-calculus** for representing objects and properties
≠ set theory (first order)
- ▶ tactics or well-typed **proof terms** for building and verifying proofs.

Examples of case studies

In the Coq proof assistant but analogous examples in Isabelle/HOL

- ▶ Formalisation of semantics of JavaCard, certification of security functionalities (Gemalto, Trusted Labs)
- ▶ Proof of the 4-colors theorem (G. Gonthier, B. Werner - Inria - Microsoft Research)
- ▶ Proof of the Feit-Thompson theorem (G. Gonthier et al. - Inria - Microsoft Research)
- ▶ Development of a certified C compiler producing optimized code (Compcert, X. Leroy)
- ▶ Formalisation and reasoning on floating-point number arithmetic (S. Boldo, G. Melquiond . . .)
- ▶ Development of certified static analysers (D. Pichardie)
- ▶ . . .

Untyped λ -calculus: genesis

Church (1930s) proposed a notation for logical formulae:

- ▶ extends first-order terms $(x \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n))$ with **binders**

$\Lambda ::= x \mid t_1 t_2 \mid \lambda x. t \mid c$ where c is a constant symbol

- ▶ A computation rule: **β -reduction**

$$(\lambda x. t_1) t_2 \rightarrow_{\beta} t_1[t_2/x]$$

capture once and for all the binding constructions.

- ▶ Formulae equal up to β are **identified**.

Note: not seen at this point as a universal computational model (such as Turing machines)

A notation for higher-order logic

Used as a notation for **higher-order logic** (for both formulae and terms):

- ▶ Symbols: $\wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \top, \perp, \neg, \forall, \exists$.
- ▶ λ -abstractions in formulae:

$$\forall x. P(x) \text{ is written } \forall (\lambda x. P(x))$$

- ▶ λ -abstractions in terms: functions, comprehension scheme
 $\lambda x. P(x)$ denotes the “set” (or collection) of all individuals (e.g. sets) that satisfy P , and application $(t_1 t_2)$ denotes membership $t_2 \in t_1$.

Inference rules (natural deduction style, Δ set of assumptions):

$$\frac{\Delta \vdash P \quad t}{\Delta \vdash \exists P} \qquad \frac{\Delta \vdash \exists P \quad \Delta; (P \ x) \vdash C}{\Delta \vdash C} (x \text{ fresh})$$

A paradox (Kleene-Rosser, 1935)

As in naive set theory, we can build the “set of sets not belonging to themselves”: $\delta = \lambda x. \neg(x x)$

... and whether it belongs to itself is paradoxical

$$\delta \delta \rightarrow_{\beta} \neg(\delta \delta)$$

Exercise: prove $\vdash \perp$, without using excluded-middle ($A \vee \neg A$).

Simply-typed λ -calculus

Church (1940) fixed the paradox by forbidding terms that do not follow a **typing discipline**.

Types are either

- ▶ one of the **base types** (to be defined),
- ▶ or $\tau \rightarrow \tau'$ the **type of functions** from τ to τ' .

Typing rules ($\Gamma \vdash t : \tau$)

$$\frac{(x : \tau) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x : \tau} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \tau \rightarrow \tau' \quad \Gamma \vdash u : \tau}{\Gamma \vdash t u : \tau'} \quad \frac{\Gamma; (x : \tau) \vdash t : \tau'}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x : \tau. t : \tau \rightarrow \tau'}$$

Church's Higher-Order Logic (HOL)

Church's Higher-Order Logic (HOL) uses two base types:

- ▶ ι the type of **individuals** (e.g. sets)
- ▶ o the type of logical formulae (**propositions**)

Constants:

$$\begin{aligned} \top \perp : o \quad \neg : o \rightarrow o \quad \Rightarrow \quad \wedge \vee : o \rightarrow o \rightarrow o \\ \forall_{\tau} \exists_{\tau} : (\tau \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o \quad =_{\tau} : \tau \rightarrow \tau \rightarrow o \end{aligned}$$

(first-order quantifiers are \forall_{ι} and \exists_{ι})

Proof assistants HOL and Isabelle/HOL use variants of this formalism.

Metatheory of HOL

$\delta = \lambda x. \neg(x \ x)$ cannot be well-typed (since $\tau \neq (\tau \rightarrow \tau')$)

HOL is a consistent logic: $\not\vdash \perp$

Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of proofs

Given a proposition A , what *are* the proofs of A ?

Case of conjunction:

$$\frac{\Delta \vdash A \quad \Delta \vdash B}{\Delta \vdash A \wedge B} \quad \frac{\Delta \vdash A \wedge B}{\Delta \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Delta \vdash A \wedge B}{\Delta \vdash B}$$

\Rightarrow A proof of $A \wedge B$ could be a couple of a proof of A and a proof of B .

BHK interpretation: disjunction

Disjunction in natural deduction:

$$\frac{\Delta \vdash A}{\Delta \vdash A \vee B} \quad \frac{\Delta \vdash B}{\Delta \vdash A \vee B} \quad \frac{\Delta \vdash A \vee B \quad \Delta; A \vdash C \quad \Delta; B \vdash C}{\Delta \vdash C}$$

Tentatively: a proof of $A \vee B$ (in the empty context) is either a proof of A or a proof of B .

But...

BHK interpretation: disjunction, limitations

2 objections to the BHK interpretation of disjunction:

- ▶ In non-empty context:
 $A \vee B \vdash B \vee A$ holds but whether there is a proof of A or a proof of B depends on whether it is also the case of $A \vee B$.
- ▶ The excluded-middle rule:
there is a proof of $\vdash A \vee \neg A$ for all A but there exists neither a proof of A nor a proof of $\neg A$ when A is undecidable.

Conclusions:

- ▶ The former remark is not an issue since the property still holds for proofs in the empty context
- ▶ The latter shows this interpretation is only valid in intuitionistic logic

BHK interpretation: implication, quantifiers

- ▶ A proof of $A \Rightarrow B$ is not a proof of $\neg A \vee B$, but:
a function producing a proof of B given any proof of A .
- ▶ A proof of $\forall x. P(x)$ is
a function producing a proof of $P(e)$ for all individual e
- ▶ A proof of $\exists x. P(x)$ is
a couple of a witness e and a proof of $P(e)$

Note: the interpretation of the existential suffers the same remarks as disjunction regarding excluded-middle.

BHK interpretation: conclusions

Propositional case:

- ▶ $\llbracket A \wedge B \rrbracket = \llbracket A \rrbracket \times \llbracket B \rrbracket$
- ▶ $\llbracket A \vee B \rrbracket = \llbracket A \rrbracket + \llbracket B \rrbracket$
- ▶ $\llbracket A \Rightarrow B \rrbracket = \llbracket A \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket B \rrbracket$

This interpretation is sound w.r.t. intuitionistic logic and can be expressed in the simply typed λ -calculus with cartesian product and disjoint sum.

λ -calculus with cartesian product and disjoint sum

$$\frac{(x : A) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma; (x : A) \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x : A. t : A \rightarrow B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash t u : B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a : A \quad \Gamma \vdash b : B}{\Gamma \vdash (a, b) : A \times B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \times B}{\Gamma \vdash \pi_1(p) : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \times B}{\Gamma \vdash \pi_2(p) : B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash a : A}{\Gamma \vdash \iota_1(a) : A + B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash b : B}{\Gamma \vdash \iota_2(b) : A + B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A + B \quad \Gamma; (a : A) \vdash f : C \quad \Gamma; (a : B) \vdash g : C}{\Gamma \vdash p[\iota_1(a) \Rightarrow f \mid \iota_2(b) \Rightarrow g] : C}$$

Intuitionistic propositional logic in natural deduction

$$\frac{A \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Gamma; A \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \rightarrow B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma \vdash B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \quad \Gamma \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \wedge B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \wedge B}{\Gamma \vdash A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \wedge B}{\Gamma \vdash B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma \vdash A \vee B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \vee B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \vee B \quad \Gamma; A \vdash C \quad \Gamma; B \vdash C}{\Gamma \vdash C}$$

Curry-Howard isomorphism

The analogy shows that the typed λ -calculus correspond to the inference rules of intuitionistic propositional logic decorated with the proof-object as in the BHK interpretation.

Logic	λ -calculus
proposition	type
proof	term
M is a proof of T	$\vdash M : T$

Extending the Curry-Howard isomorphism to first-order logic

Examples:

- ▶ For the universal quantification, a proof $p : \forall_{\tau} x. x = x$ is a function such that $p u : u = u$ and $p v : v = v$ for u and v elements of τ .

The type of p is not of the form $\tau \rightarrow \tau'$

- ▶ For the existential quantification, a proof $p : \exists_{\mathbb{Z}} x. x^2 = 4$ could be a pair $(2, q)$ with $q : 2^2 = 4$, or a pair $(-2, q')$ with $q' : (-2)^2 = 4$.

Again, the type of p is not of the form $\mathbb{Z} \times \tau'$.

Note: types appear in terms, terms appear in types. It is convenient to use the same syntax for both syntactic categories.

Types are terms typed by special constants, called **sorts**. Coq uses mainly 2 sorts: `Prop` and `Type` (with all types of `Prop` being also types of `Type`).

Dependent product

$$\frac{\Gamma; (x : A) \vdash M : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x : A. M : \Pi x : A. B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : \Pi x : A. B \quad \Gamma \vdash N : A}{\Gamma \vdash M N : B[N/x]}$$

This forms a formalism called $\lambda\Pi$. It is at the basis of many formalisms of **Type Theory**:

- ▶ ELF
- ▶ Martin L of's Type Theory

Next week...

Next week:

- ▶ Polymorphism: system F
- ▶ Calculus of Constructions
- ▶ Pure Type Systems